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Chapter 1
Summary
Income inequalities and large gaps in living standards within countries often
play a role in increasing social tension that undermine political stability and social
cohesion (Alesina & Perotti, 1996). Countries with large gaps between the poor
and the rich tend to have a large degree of socioeconomic inequalities in health
(Kennedy, Kawachi, Glass, Prothrow-Stith, et al., 1998; R. G. Wilkinson, 1997;
R. Wilkinson & Pickett, 2011). Inequalities in health are more worrying than
disparities in most other spheres, as ill health hinders people from generating
income and becoming part of daily life. It is not surprising to read an Ethiopian
man quoted at the Voices of the Poor saying ”For me, a good life is to be healthy”
(Narayan-Parker & Patel, 2000). The right to health is a basic human right,
irrespective of socioeconomic status. While some extent of income disparities is
acceptable, socioeconomic inequalities in health care cannot be justified on any
basis. Especially in developing countries, it is the poor who suffer the most from
ill-health (Figure 1). They are likely to encounter greater rates of morbidity and
mortality than do the wealthy. They have lower rates of utilization of health care
and their health spending share of income is often higher than the rich (Yazbeck,
2009).
Socioeconomic inequalities in health and education have been largely under-
studied in Egypt. Despite their substantial importance, little attention has been
given to them and this thesis aims to fill this gap in the literature by rigorously
analyzing socioeconomic inequalities in health and education from several angles.
This thesis consists of six chapters. The following four chapters are concerned
with inequalities in health outcomes specifically child malnutrition, socioeconomic
inequalities in the distribution of healthcare subsidies, the impact of medical pay-
ments on the poor, and inequalities health care utilization while the sixth chapter
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Figure 1: Region Inequalities in Infant Mortality
Source: (Yazbeck, 2009)
is focusing on labor market outcomes that results from the type of high education
received.
The fruits of economic growth are rarely shared fairly among socioeconomic
classes, especially in developing countries. It has been widely considered an effec-
tive instrument to combat poverty, deprivation and child malnutrition. Though
there is a substantial literature on the relationship between economic growth and
child malnutrition in a wide range of countries (see chapter 2 for examples), empir-
ical evidence on this relationship is sparse in the case of Egypt. The first research
question raised in this book is how economic growth affects child under-nutrition
rates in Egypt between 1992 and 2008. On average, the Egyptian economy has
been growing at 3.31% annually between 1990 and 2008. This chapter empirically
investigates the effect of economic growth on different forms of child malnutrition.
The paper hypothesizes that economic growth in Egypt has been accompanied
by a reduction in child malnutrition levels. The merit of looking at child health
measures is that these indicators are highly sensitive to changes in the public
health. The data are collected from several sources including several rounds of
Egypt Demographic and Health Survey and Egypt Human Development Reports.
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Using panel data methods, the econometric analysis failed to find a robust negative
association between economic growth and child health. Results show a modest re-
ductive effect of economic growth on child underweight and wasting rates while the
effect on stunting rates was not statistically significant. Though economic growth
could be a necessary condition for combating child malnutrition, this paper shows
that economic growth by itself is not sufficient and has to be complemented by
other intervention measures that aim directly at improving child health and nu-
trition.
After having studied the relation between economic growth and child health,
the next part of the thesis (Chapter 3 and 4) examines the distribution of public
subsidies received through the use of public healthcare facilities and the degree of
financial protection against unforeseen devastating health-care payments.
Direct subsidization of healthcare services has been widely used in many coun-
tries to improve health outcomes. The Government of Egypt allocates a significant
proportion of its budget to subsidize the health sector. It is commonly believed
that the poor are the main beneficiaries from these subsidies. Chapter 3 titled
”Are Public Health Expenditures in Egypt Pro-poor or Pro-rich?” tests this hy-
pothesis in Egypt by empirically analyzing the distribution of public healthcare
subsidies using data from Egypt Demographic and Health Survey and Egypt Na-
tional Health Accounts. The obstacle fronting analysts concerned in this topic is
that the amount of subsidies received by each patient is not directly observable. To
determine the distribution of public health care subsidies, I conducted a Benefit In-
cidence Analysis. As a robustness check, both concentration and Kakwani indices
for outpatient, inpatient, and total healthcare were also calculated. Results show
some degree of inequality in the benefits from public healthcare services, which
varied by the type of healthcare provided. In particular, subsidies associated with
University hospitals are pro-rich and have inequality increasing the effect, while
subsidies associated with outpatient and inpatient care provided by the Ministry
of Health and Population have not been pro-poor but have inequality-reducing ef-
fect (weakly progressive). Results were robust to the different analytical methods.
While it is widely perceived that the poor benefit the most from health subsidies,
the findings of this study refute this hypothesis in the case of Egypt. Poverty
reduction measures and healthcare reforms in Egypt should not only focus on ex-
panding the coverage of healthcare benefits, but also on improving the equity of
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its distribution.
Since the previous chapter found that health subsidies in Egypt are not al-
ways pro-poor while out of pocket payments are the principal mean of financing
healthcare in Egypt, chapter 4 discusses the devastating implications of medical
payments on households’ material living standards. The paper argues that conven-
tional poverty estimates do not take into account out-of-pocket health payments.
Thus, the chapter attempts to evaluate the poverty impact of out-of-pocket health
payments in Egypt. The poverty impact was evaluated using poverty head counts
and poverty gaps before and after medical payments. Data on health payments
and standard of living are obtained from Egypt Income and Expenditure Survey
for the year 2010. This survey is the official source for poverty measurements in the
country. The poverty impact of health payments is measured by the proportion of
the population who spend below the two World Bank’s poverty lines ( $1.25 and
$2 per day) after paying for health care. The analysis points that a significant
proportion of households in Egypt has crossed the $2 a day poverty line because
of health payments. Poverty alleviation policies should help reduce the reliance on
out of pocket payments to finance healthcare.
In the previous part, the thesis has revealed the lack of financing protection
mechanism against health shocks in Egypt and the low degree of progressivity in
health subsidies. This implies that inequalities in health care utilization would
largely exist between those who have and those who have not. Regular maternal
health care is important for both mother and child. Improving maternal health is
one of the Millennium Development Goals. Egypt has made substantial progress
in improving maternal health. In Chapter 5, ”Decomposition of Socio-economic
Inequalities in Maternity Care in Egypt”, the thesis looks at the degree of health
inequity in maternity care utilization in Egypt. It monitors the trend in socio-
economic inequalities in maternity care utilization over the period between 1990
and 2008. The chapter is examining whether the poor have benefited from the
improvement in population averages, as improvement in national averages does
not necessarily reflect improvement among the poor. Data are collected from the
available rounds of Egypt Demographic and Health Survey. The concentration
index is used for measuring the socio-economic inequalities in maternity care. It
decomposes the concentration index to explain the factors that generate inequal-
ities using Wagstaff et al (2003) framework. Multivariate logistic regression was
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conducted to assess the trends in the use of public health facilities as opposed to
private health care. The analysis points out that the poor have significantly ben-
efited from the improvement in the maternal health indicators and inequalities in
health care utilization have declined at the study period. However, the regression
analysis demonstrates that the public facilities use for maternal healthcare has
constantly dropped over time. The study concludes that the progress in maternal
health in Egypt has an inequality-reducing effect, but the intensive utilization of
private care raises concern on the poverty impact of out of pocket health payments.
Chapter 6 (with Dr. Ghada Brasoum):” Getting the Money’s Worth: Labor
Market Outcomes of Public and Private Higher Education Institutions in Egypt”
shifts the thesis toward studying the root causes of inequalities in the labor market.
Private higher education mainly attracts students of higher socioeconomic status
who afford the study fees. We are mainly interested in the effect of private higher
education as opposed to public higher education on the probability of employment
in the first six months following graduation, wage rate and job quality in the current
job. We benefited from the analysis of a recently fielded household survey (2012)
tracing university graduates aged 25-40 in two disciplines that have been the target
of private education institutions, namely business administration and information
technology. The survey obtains data on graduates’ socio-economic background
and parental characteristics, education experience, first job experience, current
job experience and employment history and mobility. Using OLS and logistic
models, we observe that investment in private higher education has not paid off
for graduates. Public higher education graduates have a higher probability of
employment in the first six months and have higher access to job security. We find
out that parental and socio-economic background is the key determinant of labor
market outcome, which reflects the low degree of social mobility in Egypt.
In sum, the thesis has shed some light on the socio-economic disparities in
health and in the job market in Egypt. The author hopes that this thesis would
assist the new policymakers in Egypt identify policies that reduce socio-economic
injustices in health as well as in other spheres.
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Chapter 2
Does Economic Growth Reduce Child
Malnutrition? New Evidence from
Egypt
”Development of citizens, households, and public services will not take place
unless we have economic growth that is pushed by investments” - Ahmed Nazif,
the Prime Minister of Egypt from July 2004 to January 2011, at the 7th Confer-
ence of the National Democratic Party in December 2010
JEL Classification: I14, I15
Keywords: Economic growth, stunting, malnutrition, Egypt, trickle down
Abstract
The effect of economic growth on child malnutrition has been understud-
ied in the literature by much less using panel data approach. This study is
the first attempt to empirically analyze the effect of macroeconomic growth
on child malnutrition in Egypt, a country with 2.7 million chronically un-
dernourished (stunted) children. The data are collected from several sources
including five rounds of the Egypt Demographic and Health Survey and the
Egyptian Institute of National Planning. We examine the effect of growth
in governorate per capita income on the three forms of child malnutrition
(stunting, wasting and underweight) at the governorate level. We find a
modest reductive effect of economic growth on child underweight and wast-
ing rates. On the contrary, we fail to find a significant impact on stunting
rates. The paper also shows that child malnutrition in Egypt is not a prob-
lem of food access and poverty alone and factors like inappropriate feeding
practices and poor childcare are more critical to children’s development than
per capita income growth.
1
1 Introduction
Economic growth is widely viewed as an effective policy instrument to eliminate
poverty and advance human development. The empirical economics literature is
abundant with evidence that sustained economic growth is critical for poverty re-
duction and human development. Two studies (Kheir-El-Din & El-Laithy, 2006;
El Laithy, Lokshin, & Banerji, 2003) assessed the effect of economic growth on
poverty alleviation in Egypt. They found some evidence that supports the eco-
nomic growth that took place between 1990 and 2005 has reduced poverty. The
purpose of this work is to go beyond income poverty and to examine the effect
of economic growth on other measures of human deprivation. In particular, we
develop a unique panel dataset to analyze the impact of income per capita growth
at the governorate level on childhood undernutrition prevalence in Egypt at the
period between 1992 and 2008.
The relationship between economic growth and child malnutrition is two-sided.
While poverty and food insecurity can lead to undernutrition, child’s malnutrition
may have intergenerational consequences slowing down economic growth. The
inadequate dietary intake and diseases are the direct causes of child undernutrition.
This can arise as a result of household food insecurity, inadequate feeding practices,
unhealthy household environment and inadequate health service.
On the other hand, inclusive economic growth can reduce child’s malnutrition
through three channels (Figure 1). Firstly, higher income increases the ability of
parents to purchases more calories. It lowers unemployment and creates jobs and
injects the economy with new employment opportunities. Secondly, it widens the
tax base and increases public revenues, which may lead to higher public spending
on health and social protection such as spending on food ration cards. Thirdly,
economic growth can benefit individuals indirectly by higher public spending on
roads, schools, and hospitals. However, economic growth might not necessarily
translate to better-living conditions to the poor if economic growth does not reach
to their hands.
According to the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) Egypt has the
largest number of stunted children in the Middle East, about 2.7 million chil-
dren in Egypt experience growth failure. Poor nutrition in early life has severe
consequences on child development. malnourished children have weaker immune
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Figure 1: How Economic Growth Influence Children Nutritional Status?
Source: (Subramanyam, Kawachi, Berkman, & Subramanian, 2011)
systems and they encounter a higher risk of mortality and morbidity compared to
well-nourished children. In addition, they have a reduced physical ability and are
not capable of reaching to their potential height and may remain too short for their
age for the rest of their lives. Setboonsarng (2005) suggested child malnutrition
as an appropriate measure of poverty.
Figure 2 shows that the level of stunting, wasting and underweight in Egypt in
the period between 1992 and 2008. the overall degree of stunting in Egypt is at
high level while the degree underweight and wasting are classified as low. The low
level of underweight and wasting versus the high level of stunting presents a puzzle
that maybe be explained by the global shift toward junk food with a high level
of starch, fats, and sugar (De Haen, Klasen, & Qaim, 2011). The indicators that
involve weight measurement are sensitive to this type of food, while, height is far
less sensitive to this global switch in diet. As a result, the low level of underweight
may underestimate the malnutrition problem in Egypt. The economic and social
cost of child malnutrition in Egypt is estimated to be equal to LE 20.3 billion,
which is equivalent to 1.98% of GDP (ECA & NEPAD, 2013).
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Figure 2: Percentage of Children Under Five Years Classified as Malnourished
According to Anthropometric Indices in Egypt
Source: Auhtor’s compilation based on EDHS data
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Using data from the labor market in the United Kingdom and the United
States, Case and Paxson (2006) studied the positive association between adults’
height and earning. They argued the height earnings gap cannot be explained
by high self-esteem or discrimination, but it is due to good nutrition in early
childhood. Workers who received good nutrition during childhood have a higher
average IQ test scores than malnourished. Taller workers have a higher probabil-
ity of reaching their genetic potential in height and intelligence (Case & Paxson,
2006; Case, Paxson, & Islam, 2009; Banerjee & Duflo, 2007) and this differences
in IQ accounts for the labor market height premium. In connection with Case
and Paxon’s findings, UNICEF has reported evidences on the association between
poor school performance and stunted growth, which in turn lowers future employ-
ment opportunities and income generation causing intergenerational consequences
(Subramanyam et al., 2011).
The paper is organized as follows: the next section presents the previous re-
search that addressed this topic followed by an explanation of the determinants
of child malnutrition and their methods of measurements. Section 4 discusses the
economic performance in Egypt during the period of study and section 5 is related
to child feeding practices in Egypt. Section 6 describes the data and the method,
before presenting the results in section 7 and section 8 concludes.
2 Literature Review
The literature is scarce with empirical papers examining the effect of economic
growth on childhood undernutrition. Five studies have been identified (Smith &
Haddad, 2002; Harttgen, Klasen, & Vollmer, 2013; Subramanyam et al., 2011;
Alderman, Hoogeveen, & Rossi, 2006; Heltberg, 2009) that have dealt with the
topic. These papers can be classified based on the level of the analysis, as one paper
performed cross country analysis using macro level data and the rest use data
at the household level. Consequently, their results are not directly comparable.
Using unbalanced panel data consisting of 63 developing countries between 1970
and 1996, Smith and Haddad (2002) did the first attempt to explore the effect of
economic growth on child malnutrition. They regressed childhood undernutrition
rates on per capita national income using panel data methods. They suggested that
economic growth has a strong reductive effect on child malnutrition. They argued
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the global economic growth that took place between 1970 and 1996 is responsible
for half of the reduction in the prevalence of child malnutrition through promoting
investments in women’s education, women’s status, health environment quality
and food affordability.
Harttgen, Klasen and Vollmer (2013) have examined the association between
GDP per capita growth and the reduction on child malnutrition in 15 Sub-Saharan
African countries. They have used two types of models, macro, and micro mod-
els. For the macro model, they have estimated the overall levels of malnutrition
across countries from the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) and regressed
them on GDP per capita using a fixed effect model. The fixed effect macro model
failed to detect a significant relationship between income growth and the level of
child malnutrition. Additionally, they have developed a micro model. The depen-
dent variable is a binary variable indicating whether a child is malnourished or
not. They pooled all the DHS surveys from Sub-Saharan African countries into
one single large dataset. They used individual level variables together with macro
variables. In addition to the larger sample, data pooling allows testing the effect of
macroeconomic growth on child level instead of the country level. Consequently,
the likehood of child malnutrition is not the same for every child within the coun-
try. The analysis of pooled data yielded that GDP per capita growth has a mild
effect on child malnutrition. Furthermore, their result does not hold for the inclu-
sion of time fixed effect. As a result, the authors concluded that economic growth
did not trickle down to the poor. Moreover, they suggested individual-level vari-
ables such as mother’s education, socioeconomic status, and mother’s nutritional
status are more critical to children growth than national development indicators.
Heltberg (2009) studied spells of malnutrition over time, and suggested a signif-
icant, but small, inverse association between income growth and stunted growth
among children, where phases of economic boom are often accompanied with re-
duced malnourishment rates. He claimed that the correlation between economic
growth and the stunting rate among children is much lesser than the impact of
growth on poverty. The degree of responsiveness (the elasticity) of stunting rates
with respect to GDP per capita growth was about -0.2 in a country with very high
stunting rates (above 30%), while halving stunting from a level of 30% through
economic growth alone would require an annual growth of real per capita income
by 3.7% for 25 years.
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Instead of cross-country analysis, Subramanyan, Kawachi, Berkman and Sub-
ramanian (2011) did a country-specific analysis. They limited their analysis to
India, a country with the largest number of children under 5 years old who are
stunted in the world. They used several types of models at different levels, but
their unique contribution to the literature is in the use of income growth at the
state level instead of economic growth rate at the country level. They pooled three
national representative surveys of India at the years 1992, 1998 and 2005. They
regressed a binary variable taking a value of one if a child is malnourished and zero
otherwise on individual level variables and on state-level variables. They found
no or only a weak association between economic growth at the state level and
different types of child malnutrition. They concluded that the strong economic
growth that took place in India was not sufficient to reduce child malnutrition
and recommend direct investment in health care for reduction of malnutrition.
Similarly, Alderman et al. (2006) did a country-specific analysis for Tanzania and
they concluded that a combination of income growth and nutrition interventions
are effective in reducing child under-nutrition. At the micro level, the literature is
abundant with studies examining the relationship between household wealth and
child health. The hypothesis is that better-off households have sufficient level of
resources to invest in their children health and education that would improve their
nutritional status.
3 How to Measure Child Malnutrition?
There are three major anthropometric indexes for children growth assessment: the
height-for-age, the weight-for-age, and the weight-for-height (O’Donnell, Wagstaff,
et al., 2008). The height-for-age measures child’s body height relative to age. It
reflects cumulative linear growth. The weight-for-age measures body mass to age.
The weight-for-height measures body weight to height. Low height-for-age called
stunting and it reflects inadequate nutrition for an extended period or chronic
malnutrition. On contrast, body weight is sensitive to short-term changes in diet;
thus, it reflects the current nutritional status. Low weight-for-height is named
wasting, which is a result of starvation or illness. Low weight-for-age is called
underweight. In spite of the presence of genetic variation, physical measurements
remain useful for assessing the quality of nutrient intake specially for children
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(O’Donnell et al., 2008).
There are three main approaches for assessing child malnutrition:
1. Z-score is developed by taking the difference between the value of child’s
height or weight and the median value of the reference population at the
corresponding age and sex divided by the standard deviation of the refer-
ence population. A child whose z-score is less than -2 standard deviations is
considered malnourished. The Egypt Demographic and Health survey uses
the World Health Organization (WHO)’s reference as the reference popu-
lation. This reference is based on the anthropometric measures of children
of 6 countries (Brazil, Oman, Ghana, India, USA, and Norway) (De Haen,
Klasen, & Qaim, 2011).
2. A percent of the median is simply calculated by dividing the value of child’s
height or weight by the median value of the reference population at the
corresponding age and sex.
3. The percentile gives the rank of a child with respect to the reference popula-
tion. The percentile is expressed in terms of what percentage of the reference
population a child’s height or weight falls or exceeds.
Unlike the percentiles, the z-score can be used in producing average means
and standard deviations. Furthermore, it is a continuous variable, which is fully
observable and can be incorporated directly into regression models. Percentiles
measures are not adjusted to the variability in the reference population. As a
result, the z-score is the most convenient measure of child malnutrition and it
is widely adopted in the literature. Despite its merits, it is not free of critism.
The use of single standard growth reference has been criticized (see for example
Harttgen, Klasen and Vollmer (2013)), as the genetic difference in height across
different regions of the world are not controlled for. For example, Asians are widely
perceived to be genetically shorter.
4 Economic Growth in Egypt
The real GDP per capita has grown in real terms from $895 at 1992 to $1456
at 2008. In general, the Egyptian economy has been growing at an increasing
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rate between 1992 and 1999 except for a couple of negative spikes. In 1999, The
Egyptian economy slipped into recession. The fall in direct investments and the
sluggish improvement in labor productivity brought down the growth in income per
capita to less than 2% between 2001 and 2003 (World Bank, 2007). However, the
growth rate trend was reversed in 2002 and the income per capita was increasing
again. It rises from 1.5% to 5.4% by 2008, as the Egyptian government has lunched
an economic reform program in 2004. The program aims to stimulate economic
growth by simplifying bureaucracy, custom rules and red tape that challenge doing
business. Also, the program has implemented a tax reform and lowers the tax
rates. It provided easy access to foreign currency in addition to privatization
of half of the public banks. The reform policies have pushed the domestic and
foreign direct investments significantly. Furthermore, the oil boom in the region
has led to increasing in transfer payments from Egyptians living in the Gulf region
coupled with an increase in the tourism and capital inflow from the Gulf region.
Consequently, the growth rates in total GDP have jumped to 7.1% and 7.2% in
the years 2007 and 2008 respectively (See Figure 3).
The structure of GDP and the sources of economic growth could explain the
persistence of poverty in Upper Egypt and the high burden of child malnutrition
in the region. The service sector in Egypt accounts for more than half of the
economy. It has been the main driver of the recent economic growth between 2003
and 2008 more specifically the tourism industry, the telecommunication sector, and
the transport sector. On the other hand, the agricultural sector showed a weak
economic performance, while it is the employer of the one-fourth of the working
population and the majority of the Upper Egypt residents are depending on it for
their livehood. If economic growth benefits mostly the service sector workers and
bypasses the agricultural sector workers widening the income gap between the two
sectors, economic growth will likely have modest or no effect on poverty reduction
and child malnutrition.
5 Child Feeding Practices in Egypt
Feeding practices are the principle determinant of a young child’s nutritional sta-
tus, and inadequate dietary intake increases the risk of illness and early child mor-
tality. WHO and UNICEF strongly recommend exclusive breastfeeding during the
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Figure 3: Economic Growth in Egypt between 1992 to 2008
Source: (World Bank. International Economics Dept. Development Data Group,
2014)
first six months, as mother’s milk contains all the needed nutrition for this age.
Early complementary feeding is not recommended, as it reduces breast milk output
and increases the risk of diarrhoeal disease and consequently malnutrition. Figure
4 points out that less than half of children are exclusively breastfed. Early comple-
mentary feeding is common by age 4-5 months. Egypt Demographic and Health
survey (EDHS) for the year 2008 reveals that 70% of infants received supplemen-
tation in the first six months and the median duration of exclusive breastfeeding
is 2.6 months. Despite mothers from the richest quintile are more educated than
the poor mothers, EDHS data indicated that the median duration of exclusive
breastfeeding is the shortest among the wealthiest quintile and it is the longest
among the poorest quintile.
According to WHO and UNICEF, by the age of six months complementary
feeding becomes necessary as breast milk is no longer enough to provide appro-
priate nutrition. The EDHS 2008 suggested that one-third of babies at age 6 to
8 months are not offered any solid or semi-solid food beside breast milk (Figure
4). Good complementary feeding includes daily consumption of vitamin-A-rich
fruits and vegetable and the consumption of meat, poultry, fish and eggs. Fatty
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food is important in babies’ diet, as it provides acids that facilitate absorption.
On the other hand, tea and coffee are discouraged for children, as they contain
compounds that inhibit iron absorption. EDHS collected information on types of
foods and liquids child consumed in the last 24 hour prior to the survey interview.
It suggested the majority of children did not eat any vitamin-A rich food in the
last 24-hour prior to the interview and tea drinking is also common. Appropri-
ate infant and young child feeding practices involve the introduction of food by
the age of six months and increasing the amount of food and its frequency while
maintaining frequent breastfeeding up to the age of two. In fact, breastfeeding
for two years is also a guidance from the Holy Quran, which may form another
motivate for mothers to continue breastfeeding. Appropriate nutrition includes
feeding children a variety of food groups to ensure that nutrient requirements are
met. Overall, only 41% of children met the minimum requirements for appropriate
infant and child feeding (see the paper’s appendix). The percentage of children
who fed appropriately does not vary systemically by the level of mother’s educa-
tion or among the first four wealth quintiles, which may explain the similarity in
the child malnutrition prevalence among all wealth quintiles.
This may suggest child malnutrition is not a problem of food access but in-
adequete feeding practices. Kalve et al., (2014) have conducted Trials for Im-
proved Practices (TIP), which aims to educate mothers about appropriate feeding
practices. After a week of appropriate feeding practices, mothers have reported
improvements in children’s health.
6 Method
6.1 Data
The data on children’s nutritional status have been collected from five rounds
of EDHS. anthropometric data were collected by EDHS trained staff on height
and weight data collection. The DHS is an international survey conducted in 85
developing countries sponsored by the U.S. Agency for International Development.
The DHS goal is to assess the changes and the progress in fertility, family planning,
maternal health and child health. It is the most powerful source of information on
child health and child health service in developing countries. It collects information
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Figure 4: Percentage of infants under 6 months old exclusively breastfed
Source: Auhtor’s compilation based on EDHS data
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on infant and child mortality. Normally it is implemented every five years. The
DHS samples are nationally representative household surveys. The DHS interviews
women between age 15 and 49 (reproductive age).
The sample has a complex survey design. The design involves stratification
based on the level of urbanization and the region. It involves clustering where the
selected villages are the clusters for rural areas and the selected districts/towns are
the clusters for urban areas. It includes weighting, as some observations have a low
probability of selection. These observations are weighted in order for the sample
to be nationally representative (El-Zanaty & Way, 2012; Egypt, DHS, 2005; El-
Zanaty & Way, 2006). The complex survey design has been taken into account
in all the stages of the analysis by adjusting the regional estimates to include the
survey weight, cluster and strata in the estimation of regional measures.
The five rounds of EDHS have been conducted between 1992 and 2008. These
surveys are at the years 1992, 2000, 2003, 2005, and 2008. EDHS 1992, 2000, 2005,
2008 are standard surveys while EDHS 2003 is an interim DHS survey. Interim
DHS survey is a national representative survey, but it has a shorter questionnaire
and a smaller sample than standard surveys. The EDHS collects information on
all born children. However, children who are dead by the time of interview and
children with missing data on height or age have been excluded from the analysis.
After data cleaning, the sample size of the EDHS 1992 is 7,356 children and EDHS
2000 collected information on the nutritional status of 10,547 children while EDHS
2003 has information on the nutritional status of 6,182 children. EDHS 2005 has
a sample of 12,618 children and EDHS 2008 has a sample of 9,478 children.
Between 1992 and 2008, There are 26 governorates in Egypt divided for admin-
istrative purposes. There are four urban governorates and the rest is a mixture of
urban and rural regions. These 26 governorates are aggregated into main six re-
gions in the EDHS: Urban governorates, Urban Lower Egypt, Rural Lower Egypt,
Urban Upper Egypt, Rural Upper Egypt and Frontier governorates. Each region
represents a strata in the EDHS. The EDHS sample of Frontier governorates is
always too small to allow governorate representative estimates. As a result, the
Frontier governorates have been excluded from the analysis. The Frontier gover-
norates include the Red Sea governorate, the New Valley governorate, the Matroh
governorate, the South Sinai governorate, and the North Sinai governorate. Fol-
lowing the exclusion of the Frontier governorates, we left with 21 governorates for
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each round of the EDHS.
The Egypt Human Development Reports provide data at the governorate level
that cover economics, health, and education (Handoussa, 2010; Handoussa et al.,
2008, 2003). The Egypt Human Development Reports is developed by the In-
stitute of National Planning of Egypt with technical assistance from the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The paper benefits from the available
data on the GDP per capita at the governorate level. The GDP per capita calcu-
lations are based on the national income accounts and the Income, Expenditure
and Consumption Survey, which is conducted by the Egypt Central Agency for
Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS). The GDP per capita at the year
1995 was not available; thus, the EDHS 1995 was not beneficial to the analysis.
The detailed methodology of GDP per capita estimation is provided at the Egypt
Human Development Reports.
6.2 Econometric Analysis
To study the effect of the economic growth on child malnutrition, we examine the
effect of economic growth on child malnutrition in 21 governorates in Egypt over
the period between 1992 and 2008. I develop a first difference model to address
the research question. The models control for the governorate fixed effect. Vari-
ous factors are included in the governorate fixed effect like geographical location,
climate, and natural resources. It is likely that economic growth is correlated with
the governorate unobserved fixed factors. Therefore, we have dealt with gover-
norate heterogeneity by data differencing. The following model is developed to
address the research question:
∆(cmlntrit) = α0 + α1d2003 + α2d2005 + α3d2008 + β1∆log(GDPit)
+β2∆(educationit) + β3∆(Giniit) + ∆uit
The dependent variable in the above equation is the change in the child’s malnu-
trition rate ∆(cmlntr) in two consecutive rounds of EDHS, where cmlntrit is the
level prevalence of child malnutrition in governorate i at year t. The parameter α
reflects a different intercepts for each time period. They control for governorate
trend in child malnutrition.
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Since GDP per capita is measured in current Egyptian pounds and it can be
simply increased due to inflation, it is important to adjust for price effect. But
since the GDP per capita presented in logarithmic form and time dummies for all
periods are included, then the price effect will be absorbed into the time dummies
and there is no need to convert nominal income per capita into real value. Unlike
time-demeaning, data differencing of log(GDPit) gives the percentage change in
income per capita, which can be interpreted as economic growth rate between
two consecutive rounds of the surveys. This is the merit of using logarithmic
form coupled with data differencing over time demeaning methods. Moreover,
coefficients obtained from logarithm form have appealing interpretations regardless
of the units of measurement of variables.
Our main regressor is the percentage change in GDP per capita. The Gini co-
efficient measures the the extent to which the distribution of income among house-
holds within a governorate deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. High Gini
indicates a high level of income inequality and the opposite is true. (educationit)
is the percentage of women within governorate with a high level of education. The
data on women education is developed through population censuses. uit is the
idiosyncratic error. Different specifications with additional control variables such
as access to sanitation and clean water have been conducted. However, the results
did not significantly differ than the presented model.
In differencing more than two time periods, the serial correlation problem may
appear, as ∆uit maybe correlated over time periods. Consequently, we test for
serial correlation with the Wooldridge’s test. If the test returns no autocorrelation
in the errors, then the usual methods for treatment of heteroskedasticity are valid
(Wooldridge, 2012; Drukker, 2003).
The models are conducted using the three anthropometric indices (height-for-
age, weight-for-age, and weight-for-height). We use balanced panel data consisting
of 21 governorates for five time periods. It consists of 21× 5 records.
The inadequate height-for-age reflects poor nutrition over an extended period
of time. Therefore, there can be lags between GDP growth and its effect on
child’s height. These lags are addressed by conducting an additional model using
economic growth at (t-5), as it might be more critical to height-for-age than the
current rate of growth.
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7 Results
Table 1 provides summary statistics of child malnutrition by socio-economic back-
ground. Except for the year 2008, the largest burden of undernutrition is located
in Upper Egypt, which had the highest incidence of poverty and deprivation. In
general, the proportion of malnourished children in the poorest quintile is always
higher than in the richest quintile. However, stunting prevalence is also quite high
in absolute terms among the better off. This implies that undernutrition in Egypt
is not a problem of food access and poverty alone. For instance, children with
short preceding birth intervals are associated with child malnutrition (see Table 5
in the appendix).
The models in tables 1, 2 and 3 give that the effect of economic growth on
the different forms of child malnutrition. The models show that economic growth
always has the expected effect, economic growth lowers malnutrition. In table 3,
economic growth always had significant impact on the underweight rate at 10%
level of significance and at 5% level at the second column. 10% significance levels
might be justified by the small sample size. But the value of the coefficient itself
is small. Similarly, economic growth has a significant effect on wasting rate at
5% level of significance but its effect is also modest. The small effect of economic
growth might be explained by the low level of prevalence of underweight and
wasting in Egypt (see Figure 2).
Table 3 presents the effect of economic growth on the stunting rate in Egypt.
While, the coefficient of economic growth has the expected effect on the stunting
rate, its effect is very small and it is not statistically significant at any standard
level (p-value=0.9). Therefore, economic growth that took place between 1992
and 2008 did not have practical or statistical significance impact on stunting.
Similarly, the lagged model could not yield any significant association between
economic growth and change stunting rates.
The different time period intercepts show how the child malnutrition prevalence
has changed in 2003, 2005 and 2008 relative to the year 2000. In general, time
period dummies shows that all measures of child malnutrition were significantly
rising state wide at 2008 for reasons that cannot be explained by the control vari-
ables. The rest of the control variables have not shown any significant impact on
childhood undernutrition that includes the Gini coefficient and women education.
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Table 1: Econometric Analysis: First Difference Models
(1) (2) (3)
∆(underweightrate) ∆(underweightrate) ∆(underweightrate)
∆log(GDP ) -2.692 -3.007∗ -2.895
(-1.98) (-2.05) (-1.92)
d2008 6.622 1.495 1.860
(1.55) (0.17) (0.20)
d2005 4.049 0.0722 0.222
(1.28) (0.01) (0.03)
d2003 5.404∗∗∗ 3.440 3.577
(3.46) (1.00) (1.03)
∆log(education) -1.677 -2.074
(-0.67) (-0.85)
∆(Gini) -0.0297
(-0.44)
cons -0.950 1.042 0.959
(-0.68) (0.31) (0.28)
N 84 84 84
R2 0.37 0.37 0.37
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.000
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
There is no evidence of serial correlation in the models. The Wooldridge’s
test cannot reject the null hypothesis that claims no first-order autocorrelation.
However, the likehood ratio test shows the model testing the effect of economic
growth on underweight has panel heteroskedasticity; thus, the model has been
estimated with robust standard errors.
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Table 2: Econometric Analysis: First Difference Models
(1) (2) (3)
∆(wastingrate) ∆(wastingrate) ∆(wastingrate)
∆log(GDP ) -4.363∗ -4.606∗ -3.991
(-2.01) (-2.09) (-1.78)
d2008 -2.979 0.811 13.94
(-0.49) (0.10) (1.07)
d2005 -4.002 -0.403 10.01
(-0.92) (-0.06) (0.95)
d2003 -0.949 0.809 6.242
(-0.42) (0.23) (1.15)
∆(education) 0.140 0.330
(0.64) (1.27)
∆(Gini) -0.150
(-1.32)
cons 3.203 1.471 -3.683
(1.43) (0.42) (-0.70)
N 84 84 84
R2 0.14 0.14 0.16
Prob > F 0.01 0.02 0.02
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 3: Econometric Analysis: First Difference Models
(1) (2) (3)
∆(stuntingrate) ∆(stuntingrate) ∆(stuntingrate)
∆log(GDP ) -0.811 -1.500 -0.620
(-0.13) (-0.23) (-0.09)
d2008 22.46 33.22 52.03
(1.28) (1.35) (1.36)
d2005 12.34 22.56 37.47
(0.98) (1.09) (1.21)
d2003 1.677 6.665 14.45
(0.25) (0.64) (0.91)
∆(education) 0.397 0.670
(0.63) (0.88)
∆(Gini) -0.215
(-0.64)
cons -4.971 -9.885 -17.27
(-0.77) (-0.97) (-1.12)
N 84 84 84
R2 0.12 0.12 0.13
Prob > F 0.03 0.05 0.08
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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8 Discussion and Conclusion
The paper failed to find a strong robust relationship between economic growth
and child malnutrition. Despite the real income per capita has been continuously
growing from LE 8369 in 1992 to LE 12,807 in 2008, which is equivalent to 3.31%
growth rate per year, the proportion of stunted children has remained unchanged
at 29% in the years 1992 and 2008. On the other hand, economic growth has
some statistical significant effect on underweight and wasting. However, it has no
economic significance.
In fact, the association between economic growth and child malnutrition is re-
lying on the assumption that as households become richer, they purchase more
food and feed their children more. But this assumption may not necessarily hold.
People may choose to spend their additional income gained from economic growth
on non-food items or on foods with little or nutritional value. An additional possi-
ble explanation for the non-significance of economic growth is widespread of poor
feeding practices and care in Egypt. Kavle et al., (2014) have suggested children
in Egypt fed little to no animal-source foods while junk food is a major comple-
mentary food and increasing with age. The junk food consumption is supported
by parents and some health care providers and it often replaces other nutritive
foods. There is also excessive consumption of black tea and juices. An additional
factor that intensifies the malnutrition problem is that parents do not relate inad-
equate feeding practices to low height for age. They commonly viewed stunting as
hereditary (Kavle et al., 2014).
This is not the first paper that fails to find a significant relationship between
economic growth and childhood undernutrition. For example, in spite of India’s
rapid growth performance, Subramanyan et al., (2011) failed to find a significant
association between economic growth and child malnutrition. Similarly, Harttgen,
Klasen and Vollmer (2013) studied the effect of economic growth on child mal-
nutrition in Sub-Saharan Africa and they rejected that economic growth has re-
duced childhood undernutrition. There are growing evidence in the literature that
suggest there are other factors that are more critical to child nutritional status
than macroeconomic development (Klasen, 2008). For instance, Jayachandran
and Pande (2013) have suggested the fact that Indian children are shorter than
Sub-Saharan African children is explained by the parental preferences regarding
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higher birth order children driven by culture norms of eldest son preference. In
Sub-Saharan African countries, Harttgen, Klasen and Vollmer (2012) have sug-
gested factors like women’s education and low fertility are more important to
child health than economic growth.
There are several evidences that suggest child’s malnutrition in Egypt is not
a problem of food insecurity and hunger. Firstly, The level of child malnutrition
is almost equally distributed among wealth groups (see table 5 at the appendix).
In the years 2005 and 2008, the proportions of wasted children, wasting indicates
starvation, are higher at the richest wealth quintile compared to the poorest quin-
tile. In 2008, the level of extreme stunting is higher among the richest quintile
compared to the poorest quintile. This suggests that there is a common driver of
childhood undernutrition among different socio-economic groups. Secondly, Egypt
is a middle-income country with a very low level of extreme poverty. The propor-
tion of population below $1 (PPP) a day equals 3.5% in 2005. Thirdly, the problem
of underweight among adults is a minor problem. For example, the percentage of
underweight among adult women does not exceed 1% in the period between 2000
and 2008. On the contrary, Egypt is experiencing a very high rate of obesity and
overweight exceeding 70% among adults (Ng et al., 2014). This implies that mal-
nourished child and obese parents coexist under one roof. Fourthly, Egypt has
one of the largest food subsidy programs. In 2008, the government of Egypt spent
about $4 billion in food subsidies (2% of the GDP). Subsidized food in Egypt is an
inferior good for non-poor household (Ahmed, 2001). Finally, Dehaen, Klasen and
Qaim (2011) have argued that the high rates of childhood undernutrition are not a
good indicator of development and food insecurity. For example, despite countries
like India and Egypt outperforms Sub-Saharan African countries on several devel-
opment indicators such as infant and maternal mortality, life expectancy, poverty
incidence and educational attainment but they are enduring higher rates of child
malnutrition than Sub-Saharan African countries.
We stress that the standard explanation in the literature for the high prevalence
of undernutrition cannot explain the situation in Egypt. Higher income has not
led to a better nutritional status of children and further research is needed on the
impact of individual factors such as short birth interval, feeding practices, culture
norms on undernutrition in Egypt.
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Table 4: Among all youngest children 6-23 months living with mother, percentage breastfed and receiving other foods according to
minimum practices for breastfed children
Background characteristic 3+ or 4+ food groups Minimum number of times Appropriate feeding practices
Age in months
6-8 31.3 51.3 27.7
9-11 61.1 43.4 37.1
12-17 80.2 55.4 50.6
18-23 87 47 43.8
Sex
Male 67.4 50.8 42
Female 69.6 49.2 40.8
Place of residence
Urban Governorates 70.5 58.1 48.5
Lower Egypt 70.5 46.7 39
Urban 71 44.6 37.3
Rural 70.4 47.3 39.5
Upper Egypt 65 50 40.6
Urban 67.2 52 42.7
Rural 64 49 39.7
Mother’s education
No education 61.9 48.9 39.3
some primary 69.4 43.99 38.8
primary complete/ some secondary 69.5 49.5 42
Secondary complete/ higher 70.8 51.3 42.4
Weatlh quintile
Lowest 63.7 51.2 41.6
Second 66.5 49.2 40
Middle 70 46.1 39.1
Fourth 67.1 49.8 39.4
Highest 75 54 47
Total 68.5 50 41.4
Source:
Egypt Demographic and Health Survey 2008
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Table 5: Child Malnutrition by Background Characteristic
Stunting (%) Underweight (%) Wasting (%)
Background/ Year 2000 2003 2005 2008 2000 2003 2005 2008 2000 2003 2005 2008
Household Wealth Index
Lowest 31.3 22.6 30.2 29.5 5.2 9.8 5.8 7.5 3.2 5.4 5.1 7.1
Second 26.6 21.4 24.1 30.5 4.2 8.9 5.5 6 3.2 4.8 3.4 7.9
Middle 24 19.3 22.7 27.3 3.7 6.5 4.9 5.9 2.9 4.9 3.6 8
Fourth 19.7 17.6 18.8 30.3 3 7.6 4 5.1 3.6 6 4.6 5.6
Highest 14.9 17.9 17.6 26.9 2.4 6.1 4.8 5.4 2 4.2 7.8 7.6
Birth Interval
First birth 22.6 19.2 21.2 27.8 3.2 7.9 4.8 5.7 3.1 5.1 4.6 7.2
Less than 24 months 28.2 21.8 26.3 34.1 5.4 8.8 6.4 7.7 3.1 6.1 5.7 7.2
24-47 months 23.5 19.9 25.3 28.5 3.9 8.3 5.2 5.8 3.3 5 4.4 7.2
48+ months 20.8 19.5 18.6 28.4 2.6 6.7 4.1 5.8 2.2 4.7 5 7.5
Sub-national regions
Urban Governorates 13 18.8 20.5 22.3 2.3 5.1 5.8 5.9 2.2 4.1 9.2 9.8
Lower Egypt 19.9 14.4 17.3 34.2 2.5 6.4 3.5 5.5 3.8 4.5 3.4 6.8
Lower Egypt - urban 17.3 13.2 19.7 39.3 2.3 4.9 3.7 5.2 3.8 4.3 3.1 6.3
Lower Egypt - rural 20.9 14.9 16.6 32.7 2.5 6.9 3.4 5.6 3.8 4.6 3.4 6.9
Upper Egypt 31.5 25.6 28.5 25.7 5.7 10.3 6.2 6.7 2.6 6 4.7 6.8
Upper Egypt - urban 27 20.9 23.1 22.7 4.3 10.2 4.9 7.1 2.2 7.7 4.9 8
Upper Egypt - rural 33.2 27.3 30.6 26.9 6.2 10.4 6.7 6.5 2.8 5.4 4.6 6.3
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Table 6: Child Malnutrition according to Governorate
Underweight (%) Wasting (%) Stunting (%)
Governorate/ Year 1992 2000 2003 2005 2008 1992 2000 2003 2005 2008 1992 2000 2003 2005 2008
Urban Governorates
Cairo 6.11 1.39 5.92 7.47 7.51 4.00 2.00 5.20 12.15 13.10 23.26 12.06 20.56 21.23 23.94
Alexandria 9.59 3.82 3.52 2.77 2.99 10.00 2.40 2.50 4.30 5.60 17.81 15.09 19.60 19.76 18.26
Port said 2.39 2.16 3.45 1.47 5.88 7.10 2.15 1.70 1.20 7.40 14.83 10.79 6.03 4.99 41.71
Suez 3.53 1.65 6.75 4.44 7.17 1.25 1.30 3.00 1.80 9.00 14.11 12.87 6.13 31.48 12.35
Lower Egypt
Damietta 2.42 2.20 8.70 3.76 4.71 1.20 6.60 5.00 1.60 3.90 14.11 7.49 8.70 18.82 48.63
Dakahlia 2.41 1.83 5.83 1.91 2.57 2.00 5.20 6.70 2.00 0.60 27.59 13.18 11.17 8.90 27.19
Sharkia 5.22 1.67 9.71 4.15 5.26 1.37 1.10 4.00 3.00 3.94 37.64 20.26 14.39 18.05 49.44
Kayubia 5.52 1.90 12.56 4.69 7.48 1.94 1.50 9.30 3.20 0.27 26.30 13.47 19.53 20.00 65.37
Kafr-El Sheikh 7.41 3.69 1.55 5.77 16.94 4.00 6.30 0.50 7.00 21.20 23.57 14.50 6.70 20.19 23.26
Gharbia 4.49 3.42 6.50 0.26 0.49 1.40 6.80 4.00 0.50 0.24 27.54 25.64 19.51 10.20 37.86
Menoufia 10.39 1.66 4.26 4.39 1.73 3.90 1.40 2.00 5.30 1.90 29.03 29.15 5.53 25.37 19.55
Behera 6.59 3.09 3.04 2.01 8.96 5.60 4.10 4.70 3.50 24.30 45.81 24.69 23.91 18.08 14.50
Ismailia 6.21 3.35 6.17 14.75 2.51 4.40 1.40 1.80 11.20 7.50 19.23 23.42 11.73 40.65 20.92
Upper Egypt
Giza 8.96 4.80 6.76 3.21 7.02 3.00 2.00 5.40 3.90 6.50 33.13 25.94 18.58 19.64 21.70
Beni suef 1.76 4.80 15.81 5.84 3.68 5.20 3.00 14.40 3.70 2.90 18.82 34.34 27.91 48.61 27.67
Fayoum 9.74 3.23 17.31 4.27 7.80 3.50 2.00 10.00 2.30 16.20 41.09 18.94 45.67 25.81 19.92
Menya 11.03 5.49 7.17 7.82 8.18 6.60 2.70 3.50 7.70 7.20 34.10 28.60 20.72 38.27 26.54
Assiut 12.29 7.86 13.33 6.01 6.51 2.20 1.50 8.00 2.65 5.50 46.57 48.74 24.67 19.43 32.72
Souhag 11.91 5.70 9.49 8.09 6.25 4.80 2.70 2.50 3.49 4.60 35.74 40.07 31.96 29.04 26.19
Qena 9.71 7.00 10.73 8.54 5.72 3.80 4.60 5.20 7.50 5.40 26.41 23.88 22.49 28.23 28.88
Aswan 10.72 5.99 5.81 8.58 8.62 3.20 3.10 2.30 7.50 10.60 24.69 18.30 25.00 41.60 24.83
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Table 7: GDP Per Capita (L.E) and Gini Coefficient
GDP Per Capita (LE) Gini Coefficient
Governorate/ Year 1992 2000 2003 2005 2008 1992 2000 2003 2005 2008
Cairo 2782 10167.7 11277 6157 7726 34 39 41 38 38
Alexandria 2310 8066.6 8947 5840 8978 37.9 32.3 38.1 34 30
Port said 3715 12098.8 13419 6823 10550 33.6 33.7 30.9 34 34
Suez 2170 9157 10156 6254 8746 35.6 28.7 26 29 29
Damietta 3201 6250.9 6933 6652 7884 29.9 15.5 22 25 21
Dakahlia 3489 4373.6 4851 6769 9112 34.8 21.3 23.5 23 22
Sharkia 2050 4181.9 4638 6614 8700 30 19.4 18.8 20 19
Kayubia 1554 5391.8 5980 6154 8134 30.3 24.7 25.4 25 23
Kafr-El Sheikh 2612 5037.8 5588 6270 8928 37.9 21.9 29.8 24 21
Gharbia 2133 5314.8 5895 7072 8800 35.1 24 30.2 26 24
Menoufia 1666 4212.7 4672 6799 9854 32 22.6 22.4 22 23
Behera 1566 4672.9 5183 8396 9452 34.7 19.9 23.5 20 19
Ismailia 2345 5989.3 6643 6752 8970 26.9 22.9 21.7 22 27
Giza 2123 6153.4 6825 5552 8243 34.4 33 42.3 35 34
Beni Suef 1663 3331.1 3695 7043 8857 42.8 25.2 25.9 26 21
Fayoum 1581 3612.8 4007 5706 8434 47.5 21 25.6 25 21
Menya 1554 3916 4343 6823 8656 56.1 24.3 24.8 24 24
Assiut 1519 3008.8 3337 5420 8020 52.2 23.3 24.6 25 27
Souhag 1729 3278.1 3636 5370 7330 52.2 22 25.3 24 23
Qena 1768 3930.3 4359 5543 6388 41.3 22.8 26.4 19 23
Aswan 1680 4780 5302 6053 7057 34.9 26.2 23.2 21 27
Source: Egypt-Human Development Reports (http://www.arab-hdr.org/reports/nationalarab.aspx?cid=5).
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Chapter 3
Are Public Health Expenditures in
Egypt Pro-Poor or Pro-Rich?
JEL Codes: I14; I15
Keywords: Benefit Incidence Analysis, inequality, health sector subsidies, Egypt.
Abstract
Subsidization of health care can raise public health and productivity of
labor increasing income for all. Egypt has been relying on subsidization
policy for decades to help make health care more affordable. A significant
proportion of public spending in Egypt goes to health care subsidization.
This study uses data from Egypt Demographic and Health Survey together
with data from Egypt National Health Accounts to empirically analyze how
health sector subsidies vary with household economic status. The paper
serves as a baseline for assessing equity in the distribution of subsidies in
Egypt. To address the research question, the paper uses Benefit Incidence
Analysis coupled with dominance test of significance to identify who received
the lion’s share of health subsidies. The study’s findings show that subsi-
dies associated with University hospitals are pro-rich and have inequality
increasing effect, while subsidies associated with the Ministry of Health and
Population have not been pro-poor, but they have inequality-reducing the
effect (weakly progressive). Overall, the paper concludes while it is widely
perceived that the poor benefit the most from health subsidies, the reality
in Egypt indicates it’s not.
1 Introduction
Progressive and pro-poor social spending is an objective of numerous governments.
It is a strong instrument for alleviating poverty in developing countries, where di-
1
rect targeting of the poor is seriously obstructed by the data and administrative
constraints (Besley & Coate, 1991). However, its effect depends on how the bene-
fits of social spending are distributed. The right to health is a basic human right
and many countries rely on public spending to improve the accessibility to the
health care services. Guaranteeing that the government health subsidies are pro-
gressive is very critical to policy makers to ensure that the poor can afford access
to health care. Adequate access to health care services is not only crucial for its
humanitarian considerations, but also for maintaining the productivity of the la-
bor force, and hence increasing the economic growth. Health subsidies can reduce
income disparities if the subsidies are benefiting the poor more than rich. Thus,
the effect of in-kind subsidies on income distribution depends on the distribution
of the subsidization benefits across classes.
Egypt has been adopting a subsidized health care system for several decades.
Following the establishment of the Republic of Egypt in 1952, the new socialist
regime has relied on redistribution system that promoted a minimum standard
of living by providing universal subsidies of basic consumption goods (Silva &
Morgandi, 2012). Egypt still has one of the biggest subsidy programs that provides
food aid and energy on a massive scale. In the health sector, the government of
Egypt has pledged to provide free health care to all citizens. The right of access
to health is a constitutional right. The government uses general tax revenues to
provide subsidized health care to all citizens. On average, public health spending
accounts for 6% of total public spending between years 2000 and 2009 (Figure 1).
Hinder by the availability of data especially in developing countries, few studies
could examine the distribution of health subsidies. O’Donnell et al (2007) looked
to the distribution of health subsidies in 11 Asian countries. They reported mixed
findings with a pro-poor distribution of subsidies in Hong Kong, Malaysia and
Thailand, even distribution in Sri Lanka while pro rich distribution of subsidies
has been found in the rest of countries. In addition to cross-country studies, a
growing number of country-specific studies have examined the distribution and
equity aspects of public health care subsidies in a wide range of countries, during
different periods, and using different estimation techniques with similarly mixed
findings. In addition to cross-country studies, a growing number of country-specific
studies have examined the distribution and equity aspects of public health care
subsidies in a wide range of countries, during different periods, and using different
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Figure 1: Public Health Spending in Egypt
Source: World Development Indicators
estimation techniques with similarly mixed findings (Akazili, Garshong, Aikins,
Gyapong, & McIntyre, 2012; Halasa, Nassar, & Zaky, 2010; Onwujekwe, Hanson,
& Uzochukwu, 2012; Chen et al., 2015)
Only one related study has investigated the distributional aspect of public
health care expenditure in Egypt. In an earlier study, Rannan-Eliya et al. (2000),
combined data from the national health accounts, and micro data from the Na-
tional Household Health Utilization and Expenditure Survey conducted in 1994,
to examine the degree of inequality in the distribution of health expenditures in
Egypt. The incidence of overall health expenditures in Egypt was found to be pro-
gressive. They concluded that the social insurance programs in Egypt and the use
of cost recovery in some public sector institutions contributed to greater inequality
in the access to health care resources, both when evaluated by the level of income,
and gender. The 1994-1995 expansion of social health insurance coverage to chil-
dren has not improved the distribution of health care spending in favor of lower
income households. The current study extends the earlier study of Rannan-Eliya
et al. (2000) by using an up to data from the Egyptian Demographic and Health
Survey, and using a Benefit Incidence Analysis.
This paper contributes to the extant literature by empirically analyzing the
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distribution of public health care subsidies by focusing on the specific case of Egypt
on which limited research has been conducted. Who benefits most from subsidies?
Is it the better off households or the poor? What is the effect of government health
subsidies on income distribution? These are the issues addressed in this paper. It
is the first attempt to assess the distribution of government health sector subsidies
across economic classes in Egypt. To evaluate whether public health spending is
pro-poor or pro-rich, the paper uses Benefit Incidence Analysis (BIA) (Onwujekwe
et al., 2012; O. A. O’Donnell, Wagstaff, et al., 2008; Wagstaff, 2012), which is an
accounting procedure that can determine who gets how much of the amount the
government spends providing health care to the population. In the next section,
we will shed the light on the structure of the healthcare system in Egypt followed
by a description of BIA and the survey used in the analysis then a presentation of
the results and conclusion.
2 Background
Egypt has a highly pluralistic health care system, with several different public and
private providers and financing agents (El Zanaty & Way, 2006). Public health
providers include the Ministry of Health and Population and other organizations
that receive budgetary support from the government general revenues. Only public
health providers who receive budgetary support are considered in BIA. Private for-
profit health providers and other non-profit organizations that are not subsidized
from the government revenue are not taken into account.
The subsidized health system is under continuous population pressure result-
ing from the significant increase in life expectancy and the high fertility rate.
Consequently, this has led to increasing use of private health facilities, which re-
quire fees (El Zanaty & Way, 2006; Benova, Campbell, Sholkamy, & Ploubidis,
2014). The majority of total health spending in Egypt comes from household
out of pocket payments, which may cause catastrophic economic consequences on
household’s economic situation in case a household member falls sick (Rashad,
2014; Van Doorslaer et al., 2006). In 2008, the share of out of pocket payments
in total health spending is about 60% (United States Agency for International
Development (USAID), 2010).
The Ministry of Health and Population (MOHP) operates a large network of
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health facilities that offer comprehensive health care to all Egyptians at highly
subsidized rates. It owns more than 441 hospitals and 4,839 primary health care
centers. In effect, 80% of MOHP’s service are free and the rest requires some fees.
In addition to out of pocket payments and donations, the vast majority of MOHP
funding comes from the Ministry of Finance. University hospitals are important
health providers. They are autonomous facilities affiliated to individual univer-
sities and falling under the responsibility of the Ministry of Higher Education.
The number of University hospitals is 76 hospitals in 2008 (the year of study).
The majority of University hospitals funding comes from the Ministry of Finance
through the Ministry of Higher Education and 30% comes from user fees. They
provide primary, secondary, and tertiary treatment. They are highly concentrated
in Cairo and urban areas.
In addition to MOHP and University hospitals, Teaching Hospitals and Insti-
tutes Organization (THIO), Curative Care Organization (CCO) and the Health
Insurance Organization are additional key health providers. They are quasi-
governmental organizations. Teaching Hospitals and Institutes Organization runs
11 general teaching hospitals and 20 research institutes. It provides primary, sec-
ondary, and tertiary services. Half of THIO’s services are free of charges. It serves
a small proportion of the population due to its small size. It receives funding
from the Ministry of Finance, MOHP through contracts, private firms through
contracts, international donors through grants, the Health Insurance Organization
through contracts and direct user fees. CCO is a non-profit organization under the
authority of MOHP. It operates 11 urban hospitals. Consequently, it mainly serves
urban residents. It provides a comprehensive range of curative care services. It
does not receive any subsidy from the Government, it is 100% cost recovery. The
Health Insurance Organization is an independent public organization under the
authority of MOHP. It provides compulsory insurance to formal sector workers,
widows and pensioners, school children and newborns. It is funded mainly from
insurance premiums and co-payments and it covers 55% of the population at the
year 2008. However, less than half of the insured are really benefiting from the
insurance scheme (Shawky, 2010). Previous studies have documented a number
of access constraints which contribute to inequities in the distribution of health
service benefits. These include long queues, long waiting hours, and inadequate
staff and equipment in health care facilities especially in rural areas (O’Donnell,
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Figure 2: Delivery in a Health Facility by Wealth Quintile in 2008
Source:Author’s compilation based on Demographic and Health Survey
2007; WHO, 2008; Akazili et al., 2012).
There is a large disparity in health care utilization across wealth quintiles.
Household wealth is a key determinant of access to health care. For example,
women in the richest quintile are more than twice as likely as women in the poorest
quintile to deliver in a health facility (Figure 2). Based on a survey, 70 percent
of poor households mentioned financial cost as a significant impediment to health
care (Silva & Morgandi, 2012).
Despite the subsidization, the utilization of MOHP outpatient facilities is very
low (Nandakumar, Chawla, & Khan, 2000). The most striking fact about the
choice of health care provider is the high use of private health care among the poor.
Figure 3 displays the choice of provider for outpatient care by income quintile. The
private sector dominates the provision of outpatient care even among the poor. For
households in the poorest quintile, 15% of all outpatient visits occurred in MOHP
outpatient facilities, while 70% occurred in the private sector. The utilization of
MOHP outpatient facilities steadily decreases with income. A similar pattern is
observed for inpatient care (Figure 4). The utilization of MOHP inpatient facilities
is more frequent than MOHP outpatient facilities, which is likely due to the high
fees associated with inpatient care at the private sector. The private sector is the
preferred provider for inpatient care for the wealthiest quintile and even for the
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Figure 3: Choice of Outpatient Care Provider by Income Quintile
Source: Egypt National Health Accounts:2008/2009
insured patients if they can afford it.
It is difficult to run BIA on quasi-governmental organizations, as they raise
funds from several sources and it is not possible to identify the subsidized patients
from the non-subsidized patients. Consequently, BIA has been limited to MOHP
and University hospitals, as both mainly get funding from the general tax revenue.
Three categories of health care service are explored in BIA: ambulatory visits to
MOHP, hospital stays in MOHP, and hospital stays in University hospitals.
3 Method
BIA requires micro data on the use of different types of health care. Egypt Demo-
graphic and Health Survey (EDHS) implemented in the year 2008 collected infor-
mation from 12,008 women and men on outpatient visits to health care providers,
hospital stays and on expense incurred (El-Zanaty & Way, 2009). The survey
distinguishes between public and private care. It collects information on the level
of household ownership and the information are used on constructing a measure
of living standard (Table 1) based on principal component analysis. The recall
period for outpatient visits and hospital stays is four weeks.
BIA needs the amount of public spending on each type of health care service
for which utilization data are available on the survey. Data on public spending on
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Figure 4: Inpatient Care Provider by Income Quintile
Source: Egypt National Health Accounts:2008/2009
Table 1: List of Assets Commonly in Wealth Index
Usual assets used in construction of wealth index in DHS surveys
Type of flooring Refrigerator
Water supply Type of vehicle
Sanitation facilitilies Persons per sleeping room
Electricity Ownership of agriculture land
Radio Domestic servant
Television Country specific items
Telephone
Source: The DHS Wealth Index Report
health care are computed from the Egypt National Health Accounts 2008 (Table
2). Table 2 assumes that the unit cost is the same for a given type of service.
Additionally, variations in the quality of health care services across regions are not
captured in the analysis.
The starting point for BIA is the estimation of unit subsidy received by a
patient. The service specific subsidy received by a patient can be calculated as:
ski = qkickj − fki (1)
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Table 2: Public Health Spending in Egyptian pound for the year 2008
Health Provider Public Expenditure Out of Pocket Payments Unit cost
Inpatient care
MOHP Hospitals 3,819,458,728 288,049,928 281
University Hospitals 2,638,095,984 294,610,573 536
Outpatient care 2,180,591,664 527,439,388 60
where q is the quantity of health service (measured by the number of visits or
number of nights in hospital) k utilized by patient i. f is the fee paid for service
k by patient i. The 2008 EDHS recorded the expense incurred for each type of
health service. c is the cost per unit of health service k at region j. Unit cost can
be calculated by dividing total spending on service k by the weighted quantity of
utilization provided in the survey.
ck =
Sk + Fk∑
qki
Where Sk and Fk are the sum of government subsidies and out of pocket pay-
ments on service k respectively divided by the aggregate utilization. The weights
used are expansion factors. The expansion factor reflects how many individuals in
the population are represented by each sample observation.
The total amount of subsidy received by patient i can be calculated as:
si =
∑
k
αk(qkickj − fki) (2)
αk standardizes the recall period across different types of health care services.
It equals one if the recall period is one year and equals 13 for four weeks recall
period.
Following the estimation of the amount subsidy received by each individual in
the sample, the next step is to evaluate the distribution of subsidy across income
quintiles. A concentration index is used to determine whether the subsidization of
health care is pro-poor or pro-rich. The concentration index (CI) is a quantification
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of the degree of economic related inequality in the variable of interest. A positive
CI indicates the pro-rich distribution of subsidies and a negative CI reflects pro-
poor distribution (O. A. O’Donnell et al., 2008). It ranges between +1 and -1.
The higher the absolute value of the CI, the higher the degree of concentration of
subsidies among the economic group. The CI can get more pro-poor either due to
low utilization public health facilities by the rich or higher concentration of user
fees among the rich. It is calculated as follows:
CI =
2
µ
Cov(S,W )
Where S is the amount of subsidy received by individual i and µ its mean while
W is the measure of living standard. Therefore, the CI depends on the covariance
between the amount of subsidy received and its association with the measure of
living standard. In addition to the CI, the concentration curve is used to illustrate
the share of subsidies accounted for by cumulative proportions of individuals in
the population ranked from poorest to richest.
The concentration indexes and curves are powerful tools for assessing the distri-
bution of health sector subsidies. However, a visual inspection of the concentration
curve is not sufficient to conclude whether subsidies are pro-poor or pro-rich. A
formal test of statistical dominance is necessary to definitively decide whether
health sector subsidies benefit the poor or the better off. Using the concentration
curve dominance test, the concentration curve for outpatient care is statistically
pro-poor if at least one quantile point at which the concentration curve for outpa-
tient care lies significantly above the 45 degree line and there is no quantile point
at which the 45 degree line lies above the concentration curve (O. O’Donnell et
al., 2007).
4 Result
The first part of Table 3 gives the average subsidy received by each wealth quintile
for inpatient admission at University hospitals, the outpatient visit to MOHP, and
hospital stays at MOHP respectively. The table shows that subsidies for Univer-
sity hospitals increase with wealth level. The fourth quintile (121.09) benefiting
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six times more than the poorest quintile. On the contrary, public subsidies for
ambulatory care in MOHP and inpatient care in MOHP hospitals are inversely re-
lated to wealth level. Kakwani’s progressivity index is also reported in the result.
It evaluates whether health sector subsidies reduce inequality (weak progressivity)
by comparing income distribution to subsidies distribution. It is equal to the dif-
ference between the subsidies CI and the Gini index and it ranges between -2 and
1. Data for the Gini coefficient and income shares are obtained from the World
Bank Development Indicators database.
The second part of the table gives the share of each quintile in public subsidies
in relative terms. Households at the poorest quintile receive 40% of public subsidies
associated with ambulatory care while households at the richest quintile receive
16% of subsidies associated with ambulatory care. A similar pattern is observed for
inpatient care at MOHP hospitals. For University hospitals, the poorest quintile
receives only 11% of subsidies, while the fourth quintile alone receives 67% of
subsidies.
The positive CI for University hospitals suggests that subsidies associated with
University hospitals are strongly concentrated among the better-off. The Kakwani
index for inpatient admission at University hospitals is positive, which indicates
that subsidies associated with hospital care at University hospitals are increasing
the income gap between the rich and the poor. On the other hand, the CIs for
outpatient visits and inpatient care at MOHP are both negative, indicating they
are pro-poor. Overall, health sector subsidies seem slightly pro-poor, as the CI
of total subsidies is almost equaled to zero. Finally, the Kakwani indexes are
both negative indicating that subsidies associated with the MOHP are closing the
income gap between the poor and the better off (Table 3).
The dominance tests are conducted to investigate whether health sector subsi-
dies are significantly pro-poor at the 5% significance level. The tests fail to reject
the null hypothesis that curves are indistinguishable from the line of equality, which
points that health subsidies are not pro-poor. However, testing the concentration
curves against the income distribution shows that the concentration curves for out-
patient and inpatient care at the MOHP dominate the income distribution curve.
This suggests that subsidies associated with the MOHP are inequality-reducing
(weakly progressive).
Figure 5 is a visualization of Table 3. It shows that the concentration curves
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Table 3: Distribution of Health Subsidies in Egyptian Pounds
Income Uni Hospitals MOHP Total a
Mean subsidy Outpatient Inpatient
Lowest quintile 5,153 20.05 35.94 103.81 159.60
(standard error) (20.05) (5.58) (38.82) (43.97)
Second quintile 7,216 5.95 34.22 52.32 92.33
(5.95) (4.42) (23.99) (25.51)
Middle quintile 9,086 12.28 32.06 44.64 88.91
(7.60) (4.23) (20.41) (22.55)
Fourth quintile 11,687 121.09 22.14 16.61 159.75
(69.35) (3.57) (12.38) (70.50)
Highest quintile 22,341 19.77 24.23 42.09 86.01
(19.77) (4.81) (20.54) (28.98)
Total 11,192 35.82 29.72 51.87 117.30
(15.10) (2.04) (11.09) (18.87)
Shares
Lowest quintile 9.3 11.2 24.1 40.0 27.2
(10.92) (3.19) (10.86) (6.70)
Second quintile 13 3.3 23.0 20.2 15.8
(3.50) (2.73) (8.36) (4.41)
Middle quintile 16.4 6.9 21.6 17.2 15.2
(4.89) (2.64) (7.36) (4.04)
Fourth quintile 21 67.6 14.9 6.4 27.2
(16.84) (2.28) (4.66) (9.23)
Highest quintile 40.3 11.0 16.3 16.2 14.7
(10.81) (2.90) (7.39) (4.79)
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Test of dominance
against 45 degree line none b none none none
against Lorenz curve none D- D+ D+
Concentration Index 0.3182 -0.1051 -0.2168 -0.0252
(0.15) (0.04) (0.12) (0.09)
Kakwani Index 0.1 -0.309 -0.51 -0.31
a Total refers to overall subsidies.
b None indicates that the concentration curve is indistinguishable from the 45 degree
line or Lorenz curve. D- or D+ indicates the concentration curve is significantly dis-
tinguishable from the compared distribution.
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Figure 5: Concentration Curves for Health Sector Subsidies
for outpatient care and inpatient care at MOHP lay above the line of equality,
which means that the poor benefits more from public subsidies than the better
off. In contrast, the concentration curve for University hospitals lies below the
line of equality, which indicates the better off benefit more from subsidies. The
concentration curve for total subsides is slightly above the 45-degree line for the
first two quintiles and farther is almost on the top of the 45-degree line.
5 Conclusion
Egypt has been adopting a subsidized healthcare system for decades. This paper
examined whether public healthcare subsidies in Egypt are pro-poor or pro-rich.
Results show that public subsidies to healthcare services in Egypt are not pro-
poor, meaning that subsidies tend to benefit wealthier groups more than the poorer
groups. Under less restrictive assumption, in which the distribution of subsidies
is compared to income distribution, the BIA showed that subsidies associated
with the MOHP have inequality-reducing effect (weakly progressive). University
hospitalsaˆ subsidies are mainly benefiting the rich and did not contribute to closing
the income gap.
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Previous studies have documented a number of access constraints which con-
tribute to inequities in the distribution of health service benefits. These include
long queues, long waiting hours, and inadequate staff and equipment in healthcare
facilities especially in rural areas (Akazili et al., 2012; O. O’Donnell, 2007).
Geographical access is a major challenge, particularly for rural populations.
This could explain why subsidies associated with University hospitals in Egypt
are pro-rich. The poor are more likely to live in rural communities, while Univer-
sity hospitals are in urban areas. In addition, University hospitals require some
sort of user fees and the poor are most affected by high user fees. This implies that
user fees would reduce access to health-care more for the poor than for the better
off. Therefore, the burden of user fees and transportation costs could be among
the primary reasons for the inequitable distribution of the University hospitalsaˆ
subsidies in Egypt. Red tape and long waiting lists for many healthcare services
especially surgeries, medical exams and hospitalization have also been reported as
major access barriers by the poor. Statistics from Egypt National Health Accounts
show that in 2008, only 8.1% and 21% of the insured individuals use Health Insur-
ance Organization (HIO) facilities for outpatient and inpatient healthcare. Insured
individuals reported several reasons for not using HIO facilities: distance was cited
by 18% of the individuals, 35 percent cited the long waiting time, and 44 percent
cited lower-quality services (United States Agency for International Development
(USAID), 2010).
To ensure an equitable distribution of health service benefits, poverty reduction
policies should tackle the access constraints that affect the distribution of benefits.
One policy measure for improving the distribution of subsidies is targeting health
subsidies more toward illness associated with poverty. For instances, poor housing,
poor nutrition, and lack of sanitation are associated with certain types of diseases.
The government could link subsidies to these types of diseases. We recommend re-
engineering the allocation of health sector subsidies toward healthcare services and
facilities that are mostly used by the poor households. Another policy option is
reducing the user fees associated with University hospitals, especially for the poor,
and redirecting subsidies from University hospitals to MOHP facilities, which are
the main source of healthcare services for the poor and rural residents.
Addressing the problems associated with the HIO facilities, and improving
the quality of the provided services could also be an essential step to achieve
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an equitable distribution of public healthcare subsidies and increase the usage of
HIO facilities. This has to be supplemented with improved focus on primary care
and immunization, especially in rural and remote communities, in which the Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and the private sector could play a vital
role.
This paper has some limitations that warrant acknowledgment. First, the
cross sectional nature of the used survey limits the ability to infer causality and
to examine how the equity aspects of public subsidies evolve over time. The
availability of longitudinal data in the future would stimulate further research to
study the dynamics of the problem under investigation which will help design more
effective policies to tackle it. Second, there could be other confounding factors that
affect the benefit incidence of public health subsidies which we did not control for
such as differences in geographical access to healthcare facilities, variations in the
quality of healthcare services across communities, and patient satisfaction.
We found robust evidence that in Egypt, public healthcare subsidies associated
with University hospitals are pro-rich and have inequality increasing effect, while
subsidies associated with outpatient and inpatient care provided by the MOHP
have not been pro-poor but have inequality reducing effect (weakly progressive).
While it is widely perceived that the poor benefit the most from the health subsi-
dies, the findings of this study refute this hypothesis in the case of Egypt. Poverty
reduction measures and healthcare reforms in Egypt should not only focus on ex-
panding the coverage of healthcare benefits but also on improving the equity of its
distribution. Addressing the problems associated with HIO facilities, improving
the quality of the provided services, and contracting with NGOs and the private
sector to deliver healthcare or nutrition services, especially in rural and remote
areas, could also be a promising policy option.
Health care is crucial for maintaining the productivity of labor force and, ac-
cordingly, economic growth. Direct subsidization of health care is considered a
major policy instrument to improving health in developing countries. Egypt has
adopted the subsidization policy for several decades now. It is commonly thought
that the poor are the ultimate beneficiaries from health sector subsidies. This
paper is questioning this presumption by empirically analyzing the distribution
of health subsidies in Egypt. The analysis yields health subsidies in Egypt are
not pro-poor meaning that subsidies tend to benefit wealthier groups more than
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the poorer groups. Under the less restrictive assumption, in which the distribu-
tion of subsidies is compared to income distribution, the BIA finds that subsidies
associated with the MOHP have an inequality-reducing effect.
University hospitals’ subsidies are mainly concentrated among the rich and it
failed to close the income gap. The distance to University hospitals may explain
why subsidies associated with University hospitals are pro-rich. The poor are
more likely to live in rural regions while University hospitals are in urban areas.
Additionally University hospitals require some user fees and the poor are most
affected by high user fees. This implies user fees would reduce access the access to
health-care more for the poor than for the better off. Therefore, the burden of user
fees and transportation costs could be the primary reasons for the inequity in the
distribution of University hospitals’ subsidies. Overall, the findings of this study
refute this hypothesis that claim the poor are the ultimate gainers from health
subsidies in the case of Egypt.
Health subsidies are extremely important to the poor and with the chronic
budget deficit, the Government of Egypt must adopt a corrective policy to ensure
public spending on health is pro-poor. Poverty reduction measures and healthcare
reforms in Egypt should not only focus on expanding the coverage but also on
improving the equity of distribution of healthcare benefits.
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Chapter 4
The Poverty Impact of Payments for
Health Care on Poverty Rates in Egypt
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Abstract
Illness could drive households with no health insurance coverage into fi-
nancial catastrophe, which might lead them to cut spending on necessities,
sell assets, or use credit to cope with health payments. At extreme cases, an
illness could have devastating consequences on households’ economic status
that would push them into extreme poverty. Using a nationally represen-
tative survey from Egypt, this paper assesses the poverty impact of out-of-
pocket health payments (OOP). The poverty impact was evaluated using
poverty head counts and poverty gaps before and after OOP. Results show
that OOP exacerbate households’ living severely in Egypt pushing more
than 4 percent into extreme poverty. Poverty alleviation policies should
help reduce the reliance on OOP to finance health care. Moving toward
universal health coverage could also be a promising option to protect house-
holds from the devastating economic consequences of illness.
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1 Introduction
In the absence of adequate health insurance system in many developing countries,
illness exposes households to the risk of financial catastrophe and in extreme cases
to poverty. Illness could cause severe financial hardship directly via health care
payments and indirectly due to lost income from inability to work. Households
could use savings, borrow or sell assets to cope with health shocks. However,
households with tight financial constraints may have no option but to cut spending
on necessary goods to cover health expenses. To obtain adequate health care,
many households rely on out-of-pocket payments (OOP) health care expenditures,
which increases the risk of becoming impoverished if OOP were substantial and for
prolonged periods. Excessive reliance on OOP may increase inequalities in access
to health care, as only the better off households could afford paying for healthcare.
This could also increase inter-generational inequality if the households’ ability to
invest in their children health and education is reduced (Xu et al., 2007; Alam &
Mahal, 2014).
Households with no health insurance coverage rely on OOP to cover health
expenses, which could drive them into a financial catastrophe and reduce their
economic welfare. It has been documented that catastrophic health expenditure
and impoverishment 1 are more prevalent among the poor, which constitutes a
major challenge to poverty alleviation efforts in many countries 2.
There is limited evidence on the magnitude of the poverty impact of OOP
in the Arab world. Very few studies have explored the impoverishing effect of
health expenditure in the Arab region (Mataria, Raad, Abu-Zaineh, & Donaldson,
2010; Elgazzar et al., 2010). This paper adds to the extant literature by providing
empirical evidence on the effect of OOP on impoverishment on Egypt on which
limited research has been conducted. This paper aims to assess the degree by
which households in Egypt are financially protected against the medical payments
associated with healthcare use.
1Impoverishment due to OOP occurs when households who are considered to be non-poor
(average consumption above the national poverty line) are pushed into poverty after payment
for health care services (average consumption after payment for health care is below the national
poverty line).
2Catastrophic health expenditure is defined as health spending that drives households to cut
spending on necessities, sell assets or use credit to the extent that leads to disruption to living
standards to cope with the cost of the health care treatment.
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The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a brief review of the
related literature. Section 3 provides an overview on the structure of the health
care systems in Egypt. The data and the empirical methodology of the paper are
presented in Section 4 and the obtained results are discussed in section 5. Section 6
summarizes the findings of the paper and discusses some policy recommendations.
Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Literature Review
There is substantial literature on the economic consequences of health shocks 3. For
example, Wagstaff (2007) found evidence in Vietnam that health shocks, including
the death of a working-age household member and hospitalization, negatively affect
earned income, increase medical spending, especially for the uninsured, and reduce
per capita food consumption within households.
A growing number of studies examined the prevalence of catastrophic health
payments, and assessed the poverty impact of OOP in a wide range of countries,
during different periods, and using different econometric methodologies. There
is substantial evidence that OOP may push households into poverty (Shahrawat
& Rao, 2012; Van Minh, Phuong, Saksena, James, & Xu, 2013; Narcı, S¸ahin, &
Yıldırım, 2015; Bredenkamp, Mendola, & Gragnolati, 2011; Alam & Mahal, 2014;
Arsenijevic, Pavlova, & Groot, 2013; Xu et al., 2007). For example, Arsenijevic et
al.(2013) found that OOP have a catastrophic effect on poor households in Serbia.
In particular, they found that households that are above the absolute, relative
and subjective poverty lines respectively, after the subtraction of OOP fall below
these poverty lines. They also found that the probability of catastrophic out-of-
pocket patient payments is higher in rural areas, in larger households, and among
chronically sick household members. In another study, Van Minh et al.(2013)
examined the catastrophic and poverty impacts of OOP in Vietnam and found
that between 2002 and 2010, 4 to 5% of households have incurred catastrophic
health expenditure, and between 3 to 4% of households have been impoverished
because of health expenditure. Shahrawat and Rao (2012) found that 5% of the
households in India suffer from catastrophic health expenditures and that the
3For a recent review of the literature on the economic impacts of health shocks on households
in low and middle income countries see Alam and Mahal (2014).
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poverty deepening impact of OOP was at a maximum in people below the poverty
line compared to those above. They also found that medicines and outpatient
care constitute the main share of total OOP and hence the insurance schemes,
which cover only hospital expenses, like those existing nationally in India, will
fail to adequately protect the poor against impoverishment due to spending on
health. In a recent study, Narci et al.(2015) reported an increase in catastrophe
and poverty in Turkey due to OOP during the period 2004 to 2010.
In a cross-country study of 11 Asian countries, Van Doorslaer et al. (2006)
examined whether OOP exacerbate poverty. They found that poverty estimates
after accounting for OOP were much higher than the conventional estimates, rang-
ing from an additional 1.2% of the population in Vietnam to 3.8% in Bangladesh.
In another cross country study of Western Balkan countries, Bredenkamp et al.
(2011) found evidence that health expenditure contributes substantially to house-
hold impoverishment in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia,
and Kosovo, which increases the prevalence of poverty and push poor households
into deeper poverty.
Previous studies mostly agree that reducing reliance on OOP in financing health
care significantly protects households from financial catastrophe resulting from ill-
ness. For example, Xu et al. (2007) examined the determinants of catastrophic
health expenditure in 59 countries and found that the proportion of government
health spending to total health spending, opposed to OOP share of total health
spending, is the main factor explaining the prevalence of catastrophic health ex-
penditures across countries.
Poor households develop strategies to cope with health shocks. These strate-
gies aim to sustain the economic viability of the household. There are strategies
that deal with mobilizing funds to meet direct costs such as borrowing or selling
assets. Other strategies deal with the indirect cost such as intra-household labor
substitution. The ability of households to deal with health shocks depends on their
assets portfolio, in addition to the type, severity, duration of illness and the family
members affected.
Leive and Xu (2008) examined how households in 15 African countries charac-
terized by low government health spending and lack of health insurance cope with
health shocks 4. In 12 countries, high inpatient spending increased the likelihood
4The 15 African countries are Burkina Faso, Chad, the Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana,
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of borrowing or selling assets. They also found that the high-income quintiles were
less likely to use coping strategies relative to the poorest households. In addition,
urban households were less likely to use coping strategies than rural households.
There is limited evidence on the magnitude of catastrophic health payments
and the poverty impact of OOP in the Arab world. Among the few studies that
explored the catastrophic and impoverishing effect of health expenditure in the
Arab region see for example, Abou-Ali, (2007), Elgazzar et al.(2010) and Mataria
et al.(2010). In a cross-country study, Elgazzar et al. (2010) examined the extent
of OOP and their effects on living standards in six Middle East and North African
countries including Yemen, the West Bank and Gaza, Egypt, Iran, Tunisia, and
Lebanon. They found that OOP constitute 49 percent of total national health care
on average and that households pay an average of 6 percent of their total house-
hold expenditure on health. 7 to 13 percent of households face catastrophic health
expenditures and poverty rates tend to increase by up to 20 percent after health
care spending is accounted for. Lower-income and rural households generally face
higher financial risk. In another study, Mataria et al. (2010) examined the inci-
dence and intensity of catastrophic and impoverishing healthcare payments borne
by Palestinian households between 1998 and 2007. They found a low incidence of
catastrophic health payments with only 1% of the surveyed households spent more
than 40 percent of their total household expenditures (net of food expenses) on
health care in 1998; however, the percentage was almost doubled in 2007. They
also found an increase in the percentage of households who fell into deep poverty
from 11.8 percent in 1998 to 12.5 percent in 2006.
3 Health System in Egypt
Egypt is the most populous country in the Arab world with a population of 82
million in 2010. It is a lower middle income country with a large number of poor
people. In 2011, Egypt experienced a dramatic political change putting an end
to Hosni Mubarak’s rule that lasted more than 30 years. However, the political
instability caused negative economic consequences. In fiscal year 2011/2012, the
country incurred a large budget deficit equals to 11 percent of the GDP, and the
economic growth rate has declined from 5.1 percent in 2010 to 1.8 percent in 2011.
Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Namibia, Senegal, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
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According to the World Health Organization (WHO) database, the share of the
general government in total health spending declined from 41.7 percent in 2010 to
37 percent in 2011 putting more burden on households. In average, OOP accounts
for 60 percent of total health spending.
In Egypt, the health care system provides health care services through three
channels. These channels are the public sector, the private sector, and the civil
society. The public sector refers to different ministries that provide health ser-
vice such as the Ministry of Health and Population, Ministry of Higher Education,
Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior. Along with ministries, the public sec-
tor includes Health Insurance Organization and the Curative Care Organization.
They are financially independent organizations under the authority of the Ministry
of Health. The private sector refers to for-profit hospitals, clinics, and pharma-
cies while the civil society consists of non-profit, non-governmental organizations
(NGOs). The Ministry of Finance is the major funding source for health care activ-
ities in different ministries. It raises funds from tax revenue. For instance, it funds
93 percent of the Ministry of Health’s activities. The Ministry of Health and Pop-
ulation provides a wide range of health services to all citizens at highly subsidized
rates. In addition, public health insurance exists under the Health Insurance Or-
ganization. In 2013, the Health Insurance Organization covered 57 percent of the
population. The coverage includes coverage for school students, infants, pension-
ers, and widows, in addition to employees through employment-based schemes. It
raises funds from beneficiaries’ payments, the Ministry of Finance and users’ fees.
Shawky (2010) assessed the effect of the public insurance on health care uti-
lization and catastrophic health payments. She found out that less than half of
the insured members are actually benefiting from the health insurance scheme.
Moreover, only 8% of insured use insurance for outpatient care. Furthermore, she
pointed out that the public health insurance did not increase service utilization,
but it has protected households from encountering catastrophic payments. Similar
results are suggested by Egypt National Health Accounts 2008/2009.
Table 1 breaks down the OOP by type of health provider. It suggests that pri-
vate clinics and pharmaceuticals account for the great bulk of OOP. Consequently,
they are likely the drivers of the catastrophic impact of health payments. Based on
Egypt Household Health Expenditure and Utilization Survey 2010, the insurance
beneficiaries explain why they do not use insurance. One of the tops reported rea-
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sons (44%) is low quality services, followed by long waiting times (35%) then by
the distance to the health facility (18%). In fact, the survey suggests even insured
members prefer to use private health care if they can afford it (Rafeh, Williams,
& Hassan, 2010).
Table 1: The Distribution of OOP across Health Care Providers
Type of Health Care Provider The Arab Republic of Egypt
Private Hospitals (%) 8.2
Private Clinics (%) 38.4
Public Hospitals (%) 9.1
Pharmaceuticals (%) 33.1
Others (%) 11.2
Source: Egypt National Health Accounts 2008
4 Data and Methods
The paper uses the Household Income, Expenditure and Consumption Survey
(HIECS) for 2010/2011. It is a nationally representative survey. The survey is
conducted by the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAP-
MAS) and covers 26,500 households across Egypt. HIECS is the only source of
poverty measurement in Egypt and is conducted every two years. Access to the
survey was provided by the Economic Research Forum (Economic Research Fo-
rum and Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics, 2013). HIECS
collects data for all categories of household expenditure in addition to information
on employment status, educational status, marital status and other socio-economic
variables.
The effect of health care payments on poverty estimates, both poverty head-
count, and poverty gap is measured using the following methodology due to O’Donnell
et al. (2008).
P gross =
∑N
i=1 sip
gross
i∑N
i=1 si
(1)
7
Equation (5) measures the poverty headcount P gross in which si is the household
size, and N is the number of households in the sample. pgrossi = 1 if xi < PL and
is 0 otherwise, where xi per capita spending in household i and PL is the poverty
line. The conventional poverty gap is calculated as in Equation (6).
Ggross =
∑N
i=1 sig
gross
i∑N
i=1 si
(2)
Where ggrossi = p
gross
i (PL − xi). The effect of health payments on poverty head-
count and poverty gap are captured by replacing pgrossi with p
net
i . Where p
net
i =1
if (xi−Ti) < PL and zero otherwise and by replacing ggrossi with gneti = pneti (PL−
(xi − Ti)), where Ti is the per capita health spending at household i. Then I
compare between P gross and P net and between Ggross and Gnet to demonstrate the
effect of health payments. Also I measure the normalized poverty gap (NG) gross
of health payments and net of health payments which can be calculated by:
NG =
G
PL
(3)
In order to measure the effect of health payments on poverty, we need the
poverty lines for Egypt. A Poverty line could be either absolute or relative. In
this paper, I used the World Bank absolute poverty lines, the $1.25 per head per
day (PPP) and the $2 per head per day (PPP) (Ravallion, Chen, & Sangraula,
2009). These two poverty lines are considered extreme poverty lines and they do
not have a special allowance for health care needs. Thus, measuring poverty after
taking out health payments from total spending using these lines does not require
reducing these poverty lines.5
5 Results
Table 2 shows the impoverishing effect of OOP at $1.25 per day and $2 a day. It
presents the poverty estimates in Egypt both gross and net of OOP. The first line
in Table 3 gives the poverty headcount, which is the percentage of the population
living on less than the poverty line. Comparison of poverty headcount gross and
5The World Bank poverty lines are based on 2005 prices. I adjusted these poverty lines to
account for the changes in prices between 2005 and 2010.
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net health payments gives a rough approximation of impoverishing impact of OOP.
The method assumes that all OOP are nondiscretionary. Poverty gap reflects the
intensity of poverty. It can be interpreted as the average gap required to reach
the poverty threshold. While the normalized poverty gap is equal to poverty gap
divided by poverty line. Lastly, the normalized mean positive poverty gap is the
average poverty gap of the poor divided by the poverty line.
When evaluated based on the conventional method of measuring poverty, I find
that 1.2% of the population are living on less than $1.25 a day. However, if OOP
are netted out from total expenditure, this proportion increases to 2%. So 0.8%
of Egyptians is not considered to be poor while in fact they spend less than $1.25
a day after OOP are discounted. This suggests a significant rise of 66% in poverty
headcount. The normalized poverty gap has increased from 0.15% to 0.22% while
the normalized mean positive poverty gap has declined. This suggests that the
increase in poverty gap is not due to a deepening of the poverty of the already
poor but due to more households pushed into poverty because of health payments
rather than deepening poverty of the poor.
The second part of the table uses a poverty threshold of $2 a day. The analy-
sis suggests that 3.8 percent of the population in Egypt are brought into poverty
because of health payments. This represents an increase of 30% in poverty head-
count. This is not surprising, considering the significant use of private health care
even among households from a lower socio-economic background. The percentage
change increase in the normalized poverty gap is about 33%. Similarly, comparing
the normalized poverty gap and normalized mean positive poverty gap suggests
that the increase in poverty gap is also due to more households ended up in poverty.
Figure 1 shows the effect of health care payments on Pen’s Parade of the house-
hold consumption in Egypt.6 The graph shows the total household consumption
expressed as multiples of the $2 poverty line. The paint drip or vertical bar re-
flects the degree to which OOP for health care lower household consumption. If
the paint drip crosses the poverty line, then a household is pushed into poverty
because of OOP. The graph suggests that OOP are the largest among the better
off household. However, it is mainly households that live near poverty are the ones
pushed into deprivation. The figure also suggests that even households near the
6Since health care payments could produce re-ranking in the income distribution, Wagstaff
and Van Doorslaer (2003) utilized the ”paint drop” chart to visualize the effect of health care
payments on the parade.
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Table 2: OOP Effect on Poverty Estimates in Egypt using $2 and $1.25 poverty
line
Indicator Gross of OOP Net of OOP
$1.25 a day Poverty headcount 1.2 2.0
Normalized poverty gap 0.15 0.22
Normalized mean positive poverty gap 13 11.7
$2 a day Poverty headcount 13.7 17.5
Normalized poverty gap 2.4 3.2
Normalized mean positive poverty gap 17.6 18
Source: Authors’ compilation based on the data from HIECS
top of the income distribution can also end up in poverty because of OOP.
6 Discussion and Policy Implications
This paper investigated the extent of impoverishment in Egypt by commonly used
methodology in the literature. In this paper, I hypothesized that the conven-
tional methods of measuring poverty, which do not take into account the non-
discretionary health spending, underestimate the size of poverty and its severity.
Accordingly, I reassessed the measures of poverty in Egypt at two international
poverty lines ($1.25 (PPP) and $2 (PPP) per head per day). I found that 7.4
percent of households in Egypt are pushed into extreme poverty because of OOP.
Despite that two international poverty lines ($1.25 (PPP) per head per day
and $2 (PPP) per head per day) that are widely cited in measuring and compar-
ing poverty across the world, however, these two poverty lines do not adequately
incorporate the cost of health needs. They have no special allowance for health
care needs, as they represent a measurement of extreme poverty. Illness can force
households to increase their health spending by cutting its food spending below
the subsistence level and such household would be counted as non-poor as its
total spending exceeds the threshold. Van Doorslear et al. (2006) considered
that 78 million persons in Asia are not classified as poor, however, their level
of spending are below $1.25 per head per day after taking out nondiscretionary
10
Figure 1: Effect of Health Payments on Pen’s Parade of the Household Consump-
tion in Egypt
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health payments. Therefore, measuring poverty after taking out nondiscretionary
health payment could be more revealing than the conventional method of measur-
ing poverty (O’Donnell et al., 2008). The findings of the current study support
this argument. In addition, this paper provides additional evidence that the share
of government spending in total health spending, as opposed to the share of OOP
in total health spending, is a key determinant of the prevalence of impoverishment
by OOP across countries. In Egypt, where the government is one of the lowest
spenders on health care compared to middle income countries and OOP are the
major funding source of health spending, a large percent of households are brought
into poverty because of OOP.
Given that health shocks increase households’ vulnerability and disrupt their
livelihood, government intervention is required to correct market failure and to
provide health and social protection for the poor. Xu et al. (2007) stressed the
importance of government health financing in protecting households from financial
catastrophe. They studied the relationship between the incidence of catastrophic
expenditure and the size of public health spending in 59 countries. They found a
negative correlation between the extent of catastrophic expenditure and the size
of public health spending.
The key policy implication of this study is that reducing reliance on OOP on
financing health care, increasing public health investments, and moving toward
universal health coverage should be at the core of any poverty reduction policy
to protect vulnerable households from the catastrophic economic consequences
of illness. OOP are likely to aggravate the extent of poverty and hence poverty
reduction policies should take them into account.
One limitation of the current study that arises from non-availability of data
is its cross-sectional nature. This limits our ability to examine how the problem
of the poverty impact of OOP evolves over time. The availability of longitudinal
data in the future would stimulate further research to study the dynamics of the
problem under investigation which will help design more effective policies to tackle
it.
There are other limitations that are directly related to the used methodology.
One of these limitations is that the focus is only on OOP, where the lost earn-
ings resulting from the inability to work due to illness, injury or death are not
captured, despite the fact that they may be more critical to household welfare
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(Gertler and Gruber 2002). However, the objective of this paper was to assess
the degree of financial protection regarding healthcare payments in Egypt, and
the lost earnings are not related to the health financing system itself, but to the
whole social safety net. Additionally, the used methodology assumes that OOP
are involuntary payments that consequently hinder households from using these
funds to boost their welfare. With some exceptions, healthcare payments do not
usually result from a planned choice by patients; instead, they are usually driven
by unanticipated health shocks. In this context, healthcare expenditures cannot be
viewed as a regular consumption spending that contributes to household’s utility.
Consequently, it sounds reasonable to assume that healthcare payments are non-
discretionary payments. Moreover, the adopted approach assumes that households
use current income to finance health payment. If households borrow or use savings
to finance healthcare payments and smooth current consumption at the expense of
future consumption, the assumption that households are necessary impoverished
by health payments will no longer stand. The study approach focuses on those
who actually pay for healthcare, and ignores those who might be discouraged from
using healthcare due to high medical fees. Consequently, the results of the current
study could underestimate the impact of health payments on household welfare,
and the actual burden of healthcare payments could be larger than the estimates
of the current study. Despite these limitations, large healthcare user fees in com-
parison to household income remain insightful for revealing at least a part of the
catastrophic financial consequences of health shocks.
7 Conclusion
I found empirical evidence that OOP exacerbate households’ living severely in
Egypt pushing more than 4 percent into extreme poverty. Poverty alleviation
policies should help reduce the reliance on OOP on financing health care. Mov-
ing toward universal health coverage to protect households from the devastating
economic consequences of illness could also be a promising solution.
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Chapter 5
Decomposition of Socioeconomic
Inequalities in Maternity Care in Egypt
JEL Codes: I14, I15
Keywords: maternity care, income inequality, decomposition analysis, Egypt.
Abstract
Medical care during pregnancy is crucial for protecting women from
health risks during and after pregnancy. Improving maternal health is one
of the Millennium Development Goals. Egypt has made strong progress
towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals for maternal health.
The current study examines the trends in the socio-economic inequalities in
maternity care utilization in Egypt during the period 1995-2014, using re-
peated cross sectional data from the National Demographic and Health Sur-
vey. A multivariate logistic regression model, concentration curves and con-
centration indices are used to examine the demographic and socio-economic
correlates of maternity care utilization, and how the degree of socio-economic
disparities in maternity care has evolved over time. Additionally, this paper
investigates the factors that generate socio-economic inequalities in mater-
nity care utilization by decompositing the concentration index into its deter-
minants. The analysis yields that inequalities in maternity care utilization
are much smaller in 2008 than they were in 1990. Despite the subsidization
of public health care, there has been a steady decline in the usage of pub-
lic health facilities relative to private maternity care. The decomposition
analysis shows that socioeconomic disparities in maternity care utilization
is mainly due to the lack of economic resources and its correlates among the
poor.
1
1 Introduction
According to the World Health Organization, in the year 2010 around 287,000
women died of complications during pregnancy or childbirth. These deaths are
unnecessary and avoidable since the medical interventions are available and widely
known. Medical care during pregnancy and childbirth allows monitoring pregnancy
and reduces the health risk for the mother and her baby. As part of the global
effort to curb maternal mortality, the United Nations included the reduction in
early child deaths by two third, between 1990 and 2015, as one of the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs). Egypt along with other countries has adopted these
goals to be achieved by 2015.
A growing literature has emerged to study the trends of maternal health, and
its determinants, in a wide range of countries (Hogan et al., 2010; Lozano et
al., 2011; Benova, Campbell, & Ploubidis, 2014; Khadr, 2009). These studies
have documented that Egypt has made a significant progress toward achieving the
MDGs for health. For instance, Lozano et al (2011) tracked the progress toward
the MDGs for health across the world and described Egypt as a top performing
country. The under-five mortality rate went down from 85 per 1000 live birth in
1990 to 28.3 by the year 2008. The maternal mortality ratio has declined from
174 per 100,000 in the year 1992 to 55 in the year 2008. The percentage of women
assisted by a skilled health provider in delivering has increased from 40 percent in
the year 1992 to 61 percent in the year 2008. The Government of Egypt has ex-
plained the improvement in maternity health indicators by the substantial increase
in the number of maternity care units, and the adoption of integrated maternity
care system, which includes prenatal care, immunization against tetanus infec-
tion, vitamin A, and folic acid supplements and delivery (Ministry of Economic
Development, Cairo., 2010).
While the trend in maternal health has been overstudied, little attention in the
literature has been given to disparities in maternal health among socioeconomic
classes in Egypt. In fact, the strong progress toward MDGs for health may mask
socio-economic disparities underneath it. Because the MDGs for health call for
improvement in national averages, which may attain either by improvement in the
health of the poor or the better off. Consequently, the improvement in national
averages may result from the improvement in the health of the better off while
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the poor is lagging behind. This work is concerned with who benefits from the
improvement in maternity health indicators in Egypt? Does the poor benefit? Is
the strong progress in maternity care indicators has reduced health inequalities
between classes over time? What are the root causes of socio-economic inequality
in reproductive health? What is the public health facilities’ role in provision of
maternity care service?
The concentration index (CI) is adopted as a measure of socio-economic dis-
parities in access to maternity care. It is a standard measurement tool of inequal-
ities in health economics (Wagstaff, 2000; Van Doorslaer, Masseria, Koolman, et
al., 2006). Then it is decomposed into contributing factors using Wagstaff et
al.,(1991)’s approach. The merit of this method is that it allows identifying the
root causes of socio-economic disparities in maternity care utilization.
The next section is a description of the data followed by an illustration of the
methodology and the variables used in the analysis. Section 3 is a presentation of
the results and section 4 concludes.
2 Method
The data obtained from the available rounds of Egypt Demographic and Health
Survey (EDHS) implemented in the years 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2008. EDHS is
the most important source of children and health data in Egypt. The surveys
are national representative surveys. They collect information from ever-married
women at reproductive age. The number of interviewed women in EDHS 1995
is 14,779, while for EDHS 2000, 2005 and 2008 are 15,573, 19,474 and 16,572
respectively. They contain information on demographic characteristics, maternity
care, reproductive behavior, and housing characteristics. The surveys asked women
who give birth in the last five years about access to prenatal care and its contents,
type of place of delivery and access to postnatal care. They cover the period
between 1990 and 2008 and have a complex design, which involves stratification
by geographical location and cluster sampling that involves randomly selecting a
number of clusters. The analysis has taken the complex survey design into account.
The CI is a measure of the extent of socio-economic inequalities in health care
utilization. In fact, the CI ranges between -1 and +1. The sign of CI reflects the
direction of the relation between the health variable of interest and household’s
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position in the living standard distribution. A CI with negative sign implies that
the maternity care utilization is concentrated among the poor, while a positive
CI suggests that it is the better off who benefit the most. In absolute value, the
magnitude of the CI indicates the strength of the relation between the health
variable of interest and economic status; the higher the value of the CI, the higher
the degree of the concentration among the poor or the better off depending on the
CI sign. Analogous to the Gini coefficient, a CI with zero value indicates perfect
equality. The CI is computed as in equation 1 (O’Donnell, Wagstaff, et al., 2008).
CI =
2
µ
Cov(H,W ) (1)
Where H is an indicator of health variable and µ its mean, while W is a measure
of living standard and cov is the covariance between H and W. The CI is computed
for the years 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2008. By comparing the values of concentra-
tion indexes over time, we can determine whether the degree of socio-economic
inequalities in maternity care are smaller in the year 2008 than they were in the
year 1995.
Wagstaff et al,.(2003) showed that the CI could be decomposed into the con-
tributions of individual determinants, where each contribution is the product of
the sensitivity of receiving maternity care with respect to that factor and the level
of economic-related inequality in that factor. For any linear model of health care
(H), such as
Hi = α +
∑
k
βkxki + εi (2)
The CI for H can be shown as
CI =
∑
k
(
βk.xki
µ
)Ck +
GCε
µ
(3)
Where µ is the average mean of maternity care utilization and x is the mean of
factor x. Ck is the concentration index for factor x and GC is the concentration
index for error term. The above equation shows that the overall CI is constituted
of two parts, a part that is explained by the systemic variation in the determinants
and a part that cannot by explained by it. The unsystematic part approaches zero
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in a well-specified model. Thus, the CI is the product of the elasticity of the
dependent variable H with respect to the regressor x (βk.xk
µ
) and income related
inequality in that factor Ck. The decomposition analysis is conducted in the
following steps:
1. The maternity care utilization variable is regressed on its determinants using
an adequate model. This produces the coefficients of the determinants.
2. The average means of the dependent variables and independent variables are
computed.
3. The concentration indexes for the dependent variable and the explanatory
variables computed using equation 1.
4. The percentage contribution of each determinant can be computed by:
(βk.xki
µ
)Ck
C
(4)
The two dependent variables are binary variables. Therefore, probit models
have been used. If a non-linear model is used, the decomposition analysis is only
possible if linear approximation to the non-linear model is made (O’Donnell et al.,
2008). Estimates of the partial effects evaluated at the average means are used to
give a linear approximation of equation 2:
Hm = αm +
∑
k
βmk xki + εi (5)
Where βm are the marginal effects evaluated at sample means. Since equation
5 is linearly additive, the decomposition method can be applied. However, the
decomposition result is not unique, as the partial effects are at particular values
of the determinants.
CI =
∑
k
(
βmk .xki
µ
)Ck +
GCε
µ
(6)
The main variables of interest are regular antenatal care ( four or more visits to
prenatal care provider during pregnancy) and delivery in a health facility (dummy
variable). Both represent the necessary care during pregnancy.
5
The decomposition analysis is conducted only on the most recent round of
EDHS. It includes the following standard set of covariates: mother’s age at the
time of birth, household wealth index based on the level of household’s assets
ownership, mother’s educational level (zero if no education, 1 if primary, 2 if
secondary, 3 if higher education), high-risk fertility behavior (binary variable equals
one if a mother is younger than 18 years old or older than 34 years, or latest birth
less than 24 months ago, or latest birth being of order 3 or higher), location of
residence (1 if mother lives in Urban Governorates, 2 if mother lives in Lower
Egypt Urban, 3 for Lower Egypt Rural, 5 for Upper Egypt Urban, 6 for Upper
Egypt Rural and 7 for Frontier Governorates), a binary variable taking a value of
1 if the interviewed mother ever had a pregnancy that terminated in a miscarriage,
abortion, or still birth, i.e., did not result in a live birth and zero otherwise.
3 Result
3.1 Trends in Socio-economic Inequalities
Table 1 gives the proportion of women who received prenatal care or medically
assisted at delivery according to wealth quintile. The column total provides the
national averages. It shows the steep increase in access to maternity care between
1990 and 2008. The numbers in table 1 suggest that even women in the poorest two
quintiles have increased their utilization of maternity care substantially over the 18
years period. The last column provides the CIs for the years 1995, 2000, 2005 and
2008. They all have positive value, which points the positive association between
economic status and utilization of maternity care. Comparing the estimated CIs
over time suggests that the degree of socio-economic inequalities in maternity care
have significantly declined. Economic inequalities in maternity care are smaller in
2008 than they were in 1995. Despite the progress, there is a significant proportion
of the poor who have not obtained prenatal care or medically assisted during
delivery.
The Government of Egypt and Khadr (2009) have attributed the improvements
in maternity health to the state’s success in the provision of health care (Ministry
of Economic Development, Cairo., 2010). The Ministry of Economic Development
(2010) has explained the progress in maternity care indicators by the increase in
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Table 1: Socio-economic inequalities in Maternity care
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Total CI
Regular Prenatal Care
1995 7 11 25 41 72 28 0.43
2000 14 22 36 51 76 39 0.32
2005 31 46 61 77 88 59 0.19
2008 42 56 65 81 91 67 0.15
Medically Assisted at Delivery
1995 20 30 47 62 87 47 0.28
2000 31 46 62 76 94 61 0.21
2005 51 65 79 88 97 75 0.12
2008 55 70 83 91 97 79 0.10
the number of maternity care units and the adoption of integrated maternity care
system. The EDHS does not collect data on the type of prenatal care provider.
However, it asked about the type of the place of delivery whether the delivery took
place in a public or private facility. After pooling the four rounds of EDHS into
one data set, the following model examines what has happened to the use of public
health facilities over time. The dependent variable is a dummy variable taking a
value of one if a mother gives birth at a governmental health facility and zero if
she gives birth at a private health facility. The model mainly interested in the
pattern of coefficients on the time dummies.
After controlling for household economic status, mother’s education level, mother’s
age at time of delivery, and region of residence, time dummies show the steady
drop in the use of public health facilities over time in comparison to private health
care (Table 2). This finding has important implications, it is true that the Govern-
ment of Egypt has increased the number of maternity health units and introduce
new programs to encourage maternity care utilization, which led politicians to con-
clude that the government’s role in provision of maternity care was an important
determinant of maternal health when in fact it was not. Direct state’s intervention
cannot explain the increase in the use of medical care during pregnancy. The pri-
vate sector has been the main provider of maternity care in the study period. The
increasing use of private maternity care, which requires out of pocket payments,
has the disruptive effect on the poor and near-poor households.
The model also reveals that women in urban governorates are more likely to de-
liver at a private health facility. As expected delivery at a private facility increases
with mother’s level of education. The probability of delivering at a private facility
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Table 2: Estimation results : Place of Delivery (Public vs Private)
Variable Odds ratio (Robust Std. Err.)
Time Dummies
d2000 0.761∗∗ (0.034)
d2005 0.576∗∗ (0.024)
d2008 0.544∗∗ (0.023)
Wealth Quintiles
Second 3.30∗∗ (0.200)
Middle 2.80∗∗ (0.153)
Fourth 2.57∗∗ (0.122)
Richest quintile 1.86∗∗ (0.077)
Mother’s Education Level
No education 2.23∗∗ (0.127)
Primary 2.74∗∗ (0.163)
Secondary 1.81∗∗ (0.085)
Regions
Lower Urban 0.419∗∗ (0.021)
Lower Rural 0.290∗∗ (0.013)
Upper Urban 0.659∗∗ (0.030)
Upper Rural 0.504∗∗ (0.024)
Frontier Governorates 1.078 (0.068)
Mother’s age at delivery 1.006∗∗ (0.002)
Intercept 0.514∗∗ (0.044)
N 25400
Pseudo R2 0.07
Log-likelihood -16128.943
χ2(16) 2192.222
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
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increases monotonically with wealth level. Mother’s age has almost no effect on
the type of the place of delivery.
3.2 Decomposition Result
The next step is to decompose the concentration index for the last EDHS round
in order to identify the drivers of socio-economic inequalities in maternity care
utilization. Table 3 gives the basic summary statistics of the variables used in the
analysis. The first column shows the number of observations while the next three
columns give the mean, minimum, maximum for each variable. The last column
indicates the number of unique values. The majority of the population lives in
rural regions. Mean mother’s age at the time of birth is 26 and the minimum is
14 years.
Table 3: Summary Statistics
N mean min max N unique
Urban/Rural 10,872 1.6 1.0 2.0 2
Wealth Index 10,872 -15,473.3 -304,730.0 291,711.0 6,808
Mother Age at birth 10,872 26.1 14.2 47.5 378
Mother’s Education 10,872 1.5 0.0 3.0 4
Sampling weights 10,872 1.0 0.2 1.7 27
Figure 1 presents the concentration curve for antenatal and delivery care. These
curves show the cumulative share of maternity care utilization according to the cu-
mulative share of the population, ranked by economic status. If the concentration
curve lies below the 45-degree line, it indicates that maternity care utilization is
more concentrated among the rich and the opposite is true. Similar to the Lorenz
curve, the farther a curve from the equality line, the higher the degree of concen-
tration. Comparing the concentration curves for the regular prenatal care at the
years 1995 and 2008 shows that disparities in receiving regular maternal care has
narrowed, as the concentration curve for the year 2008 is closer to the equality line
relative to the concentration curve for the year 1995. The same finding is observed
for receiving medical care during child delivery.
The decomposition of the CI for the maternity care variables is given at table
4. The decomposition analysis allows distinguishing inequality from inequity (the
part of inequality that is unjustifiable). There are two types of variables in the
decomposition analysis, the standardizing variables (variables that reflect health
9
Figure 1: Concentration Curves of Medical Maternity Care Utilization
Source: Author’s compilation based on EDHS data
care need and their association with health utilization is justifiable such as age)
and control variables (variables whose correlation to health utilization is unfair
such as income).
The first part of the table shows the contribution of the standardizing vari-
ables to the CI. The second part of the table gives the contribution of the control
variables to the CI. The CI can be computed by adding the residuals to the con-
tribution of both types of variables. Each contribution to the CI is the product
of the sensitivity of maternity care utilization with respect to the corresponding
determinant and the degree of income-related inequality in that determinant. A
factor with a significant effect on maternity care utilization but with no income
related inequality will have a small contribution to the CI.
The analysis shows that factors like history of mother’s terminated pregnancy,
mother’s age at birth and risky birth interval have a small contribution to socio-
economic inequality (0.005). On the other hand, the decomposition analysis reveals
that the direct effect of wealth inequality accounts for the majority of the CI. It
accounts for 62% ( 0.094
0.15
as in equation 4) of the CI for prenatal care and 58% of
the CI for delivery in a health facility.
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Table 4: Decomposition of Concentration Index for Maternity Care Utilization,
non-linear model
Antenatal Care Delivery in a Facility
Standardizing (need) variables
Mother’s age -0.0015 0.0014
Ever had a terminated preg. -0.0002 -0.0001
Risky birth 0.0068 0.0084
Subtotal 0.0051 0.0097
Control variables
Wealth index 0.0946 0.0810
Mother’s educational 0.0364 0.0253
Region 0.0229 0.0302
Subtotal 0.1539 0.1366
Residual: regression error -0.0069 -0.0074
Residual: missing data 0.0000 0.0000
Inequality (total) 0.1521 0.1388
Inequity/Unjustified inequality 0.1470 0.1292
Mother’s illiteracy is more prevalent among the poor and associated with a
low probability of using reproductive health care. The wealth-related inequality
in women education contributes to the CI by 24% for antenatal care and 18% for
delivery in a health facility. Similarly, rural residence is more common among the
poor and associated with lower likehood of seeking maternal health care. The
average utilization of maternal health service in the rural regions is below the
national average. Consequently, early child mortality and maternal mortality are
higher than nationally. The contribution of the place of residence accounts for
15% of the CI for antenatal care and 21% for delivery in a health facility.
4 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper investigated the socio-economic inequalities in maternal health care in
Egypt during the period 1995-2014 using repeated cross-sectional data from the
Egypt Demographic and Health Survey. A multivariate logistic regression model,
concentration curves , CIs and decomposition of CIs are used to address the re-
search question of this study. The analysis has drawn three main findings. Firstly,
the analysis yields that the extent of socioeconomic inequalities in maternity care
utilization has declined between 1990 and 2008. Women in households of lower
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socio-economic status have increased their use of reproductive health substantially
between 1990 and 2008. Secondly, despite the dramatic rise in access to medical
care during pregnancy in Egypt, disparities in pregnancy care indicators between
the poor and the better off exist and family wealth remains a significant determi-
nant of access to medical care. The decomposition analysis results are in line with
these findings, as it reveals that socio-economic inequalities in maternity care are
not due to health care need by women of high socio-economic status. Poverty itself,
in the form of low level of assets ownership, explains most of the socio-economic
inequalities in maternity care. Correlates of poverty (residence in rural regions,
low education levels) have a significant contribution to the CI. This implies that
increasing women education among the poor and poverty reduction in rural regions
would narrow disparities in maternity care. Thirdly, while It is commonly thought
that the increase in the use of maternity care in Egypt is arising from the use of
subsidized care, the paper explores the time trend toward the use of public health
facilities for delivery service and it suggests that the rise in the use of maternity
care in Egypt is mainly coming from the use of private health facilities. Although
public health facilities provide services at low or no charge and the vast majority
of the population has a health unit within five kilometers from their residence,
affordable private care remains the preferred health care provider. The market for
maternity care is mainly controlled by private health providers. In 2008, 63% of
women who deliver in a health facility used private facilities and incurred expense
for the service (El-Zanaty & Way, 2009).
A potential explanation for the domination of private maternal care that re-
quires user fees is the perception of public health care providers as an inferior
service. Yip and Orbeta (1999) have developed an index that measures the indi-
viduals perception of quality of health care. They have found that private sector
substantially outscores government health sector across all dimensions of quality.
They have suggested the public failure in the provision of health care that meet
consumers needs is mainly due to the poor quality of public health facilities. An
additional potential explanation for the low usage of public health facilities is the
diversion of patients by doctors of the public sector to their private clinics, as
physicians of MOHP are allowed to work in private sector. The literature sug-
gested that MOHP doctors increase their working hours at private sector at the
expense of their working hours at MOHP facilities. There is a remarkable in-
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verse association between working hours at MOHP facilities and working hours at
private clinics (Nandakumar, Chawla, & Khan, 2000).
Several programs have been conducted in developing countries to remove dis-
parities in maternity care. These include conditional cash transfers, private provider
reimbursement, voucher schemes (Morris, Flores, Olinto, & Medina, 2004; Sosa-
Rub´ı, Walker, Serva´n, & Bautista-Arredondo, 2011; Ahmed & Khan, 2011; Agha,
2011; Meuwissen, Gorter, & Knottnerus, 2006). These programs could have a
positive impact on the utilization of maternity care in Egypt.
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Table 5: Medical Maternity Service Utilization by Household Characteristics
Antenatal Care Delivery at facility
Area of residence
Urban 0.808467 0.855167
(0.006961) (0.006204)
Rural 0.580159 0.636726
(0.006312) (0.006073)
Mother’s educational level
No education 0.453209 0.515586
(0.009861) (0.009822)
Primary 0.606858 0.650206
(0.016066) (0.015520)
Secondary 0.725335 0.781462
(0.006536) (0.005951)
Higher 0.899706 0.925674
(0.008900) (0.007640)
Wealth Quintiles
Poorest quintile 0.417019 0.453559
(0.010709) (0.010774)
Poorer 0.558784 0.614945
(0.011279) (0.010979)
Middle 0.649958 0.737838
(0.011218) (0.010184)
Richer 0.800029 0.840401
(0.009737) (0.008932)
Richest quintile 0.898812 0.941516
(0.007566) (0.005811)
Total 0.665129 0.717684
(0.004885) (0.004592)
Standard CI 0.152 0.139
(0.0042) (0.0038)
Standard errors in parentheses
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Table 6: Fitted Non-linear Model: Probit Model
Antenatal Care Place of Delivery
coef se coef se
Standardizing (need) variables
Mother’s age -0.0033 0.0009 0.0034 0.0008
ever had a terminated preg. 0.0655 0.0117 0.0441 0.0105
risky birth interval -0.0756 0.0115 -0.0997 0.0106
Control variables
Wealth Index
poorest
poorer 0.0954 0.0160 0.0905 0.0157
middle 0.1321 0.0173 0.1514 0.0166
richer 0.2561 0.0184 0.2216 0.0177
richest 0.2974 0.0197 0.2797 0.0184
Highest Educational Level
no education
primary 0.0761 0.0185 0.0452 0.0180
secondary 0.1200 0.0140 0.0984 0.0131
higher 0.1930 0.0176 0.1329 0.0160
Region
urban governorates
lower Egypt urban -0.0685 0.0167 -0.0300 0.0145
lower Egypt rural -0.0890 0.0147 -0.0322 0.0133
upper Egypt urban -0.0351 0.0165 -0.0476 0.0144
upper Egypt rural -0.1224 0.0168 -0.1742 0.0159
frontier governorates -0.0558 0.0219 -0.0320 0.0198
Intercept 0.5924 0.0300 0.5063 0.0282
Number of observations 10,795 10,870
Adjusted R2 0.16 0.18
18
1 
 
Chapter 6: Does Private Higher Education 
Improve Employment Outcomes? 
Comparative Analysis from Egypt 
Abstract  
This paper examines whether there are differences in the labour market outcomes for graduates 
of public and private higher education institutions in Egypt in the two fields of information and 
computing technology, and business administration.  The paper focuses on outcomes related to 
employability in the first six months upon graduation; earnings and access to job fringe benefits 
in the current job. The analysis relies on unique data set tracing graduates aged 25-40 years in the 
two fields of focus. The analysis in this paper is based on two modeling approaches: linear 
probability model for the probability of employment in the first six months after graduation; and 
ordinary least squares analysis of determinants of access to job fringe benefits and earnings. 
Private education had a significant negative effect on the likelihood of getting a job in the first 
six months following graduation and had no significant effect on job fringe benefits and earnings 
in the current job.  Ascribed characteristics of gender; parental and socio-economic background 
were key predictors of the labour market outcomes, regardless of the type of higher education 
institution. 
 
Keywords: private higher education, labour market outcomes, Egypt, Youth 
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1. Introduction 
 
The expansion of private higher education has been a global policy approach, described by 
Altbach et al. (2009:13) as a “private revolution”.  About one third of global higher education 
enrollment is currently provided by private institutions (Altbach et al. 2009, Levy and Zumeta 
2011). The growth of private higher education has been a response to higher education 
massification, where access shifts from being a privilege limited to the elite to trickling down to 
the middle and lower-middle classes (Trow, 2006).  Systems with a tradition of highly subsidized 
tertiary education, similar to Egypt, particularly suffer as they experience this massification 
process. The increasing demand for higher education places pressures for more institutions and 
seats beyond the capacity of state budgets. This situation opens the way for a bigger role by 
private institutions to respond to the increasing demand. Altbach et al. (2009) note that most of 
the growth in higher education worldwide over the past decades has been in private higher 
education, with private higher education institutions representing the fastest-growing sector.  
Neoliberal approaches for higher education reform and the globalization tide have both 
constituted two driving forces for a growing role of markets in higher education (Mok, 2009).  
Public policy pertaining to the private provision of higher education is, therefore, of global 
importance (Levy and Zumeta 2011). 
 
Despite the growing role of private higher education, there is little knowledge about their 
labour market outcomes in comparison to public higher education. Comparative research 
concerning private and public higher education is quite rare, with research primarily focusing on 
public institutions (Levy and Zumeta 2011). Whether these new comers to the higher education 
landscape are effective in delivering quality education that prepares graduates to the labour 
market is an important policy and empirical question. Students and their families, the key 
stakeholders and consumers of private higher education, pay the consequences of information 
asymmetries as they take the decision to choose this newly uncharted route of higher education. 
Research on labour market outcomes of these institutions could ameliorate the consequences of 
these information asymmetries. This is particularly relevant in Egypt, because students in public 
institutions predominantly pay nominal fees, while those in private institutions pay much more 
fees.  It is important to investigate whether the graduates of private institutions are getting a 
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return on the financial investment made by their families for higher education, in comparison to 
graduates of public institutions 
 
The key research question that this paper seeks to address is whether there is a difference 
in the labour market outcomes between graduates of private and public institutions.  The analysis 
is limited to two key specializations that have witnessed an exponential growth in private 
provision in Egypt, business administration and information and computing technology (ICT).   
Similar to the global experience, Egypt’s private higher education is primarily provided by non-
university-ranked institutions in predominantly applied fields (Levy 2011). This paper is 
organized as follows. This introductory part is followed by a description of the situation of the 
labour market and the higher education system in Egypt. The methodology, data and the 
descriptive statistics are then discussed, followed by the estimation results.  The paper concludes 
with a discussion of the policy implications of these results.   
2. Background: The Structure of the Higher Education System in Egypt and 
Youth Employment Issues 
 
The higher education system in Egypt is the largest in the Arab region.  The system enrolled 2.6 
million students in 2009/10 and is expected to enroll 1.1 million more students in 2021, 
increasing the higher education participation rate from 28% to 35% over the same period (OECD 
& WB, 2010).   The system carries a legacy of state monopoly over the provision of higher 
education.  The onset of system expansion is rooted in the legacy of Egypt’s development project 
of the socialist era of the 1960s, particularly when higher education was declared a free right to 
all Egyptians in 1962 based on a meritocratic admission system.
1
  Two- and four-year Private 
higher institutes, which do not have the rank of universities, started to show presence in Egypt’s 
higher education landscaper since the 1970s with the implementation of market-oriented policies.  
Since their inception, these private institutes were designed to absorb students who could not 
achieve the needed score in the secondary school completion examination to join universities.   
                                                 
1
 This has been the case despite the fact that the first modern university in Egypt, Cairo University, was established 
as a private university in 1908.   
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Until the 1990s, Egyptian universities were almost exclusively public.
2
  In 1992, Law 101 was 
passed to authorize and regulate the establishment of private universities. Following the 
promulgation of the law, four new universities opened their doors in 1996, followed by five 
institutions in 2000 and six universities in 2006 (OECD and World Bank, 2010).    
  
According to recent data obtained from the Ministry of Higher Education, private higher 
education institutions provided education to about 21.2% of tertiary education in Egypt in 
2010/11.  Most of this private higher education is provided by non-university-ranked institutes 
(providing 17.6% of total higher education enrolment in 2010/11).  The number of these 
institutes jumped from 132 institutes in 2010/11 to 1711 in 2014/15 as listed in the Ministry of 
Higher Education’s website. Private universities only provide higher education to 3.5% of 
students enrolled in tertiary education in Egypt, provided by 20 private universities in 2014/15, 
up from 19 universities in 2010/11.
3
  Similar to the global experience, it is envisioned that their 
role will increase with the impact of massification, globalization and neoliberalism. The higher 
education system in Egypt, A larger role by private higher education institutions has been one of 
the key recommendations by international entities to the Egyptian government (e.g. ibid.; World 
Bank, 2008). 
 
There are two key differences between private and public higher education institutions 
that should be explained as background to the analysis.  The first is that private institutions are at 
education fees, whereas public institutions are predominately for nominal administrative fees.   
The second is that, with the exception of elite universities, private institutions have been 
historically designed to absorb students who did not achieve the cut-off score in the secondary 
education completion examination. The system has been historically designed to make this group 
of less achieving students pay for their higher education. This legacy started to change with the 
pressures of massification and neoliberal policies. The cut-off score for public scores is getting 
very high, pushing families to send achieving students to private institutions to remain in their 
specialization of choice. Moreover, there has been a movement to establish elite at-fee programs 
                                                 
2
 A key exception was the American University of Cairo, which was founded in 1919 as private non-profit American 
institution.  The sample did not include graduates of this institution. 
3
 Data provided in this paragraph build on the author’s communication with the Strategic Planning Unit at the 
Ministry of Higher Education.  The author is grateful for the support extended by this unit to the study. More 
recent data was obtained from the governmental website for higher education admission: 
http://www.tansik.egypt.gov.eg/application/Certificates/Fani/Dalel/12.htm. 
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in a few public institutions. Public universities are also opening sections for students not 
achieving the cut-off admission score in certain disciplines at added fees. Private institutions, on 
the other hand, are far from uniform.  This is a reflection of the global typology of private higher 
education institutions, offered by Altbach et al. (2009), into elite, semi-elite, and demand-
absorbing institutions. In Egypt, private universities with international linkages can be 
appropriately ranked as elite.   Private universities without the international linkages and offered 
at less fees can be considered as “semi-elite”.  The rest of the higher institutes, whose fees 
structure can be as low as $500 per year, can be safely described as demand absorbing. The 
Egyptian labor market is characterized by high-educated youth unemployment.  Those with post-
secondary education constitute 39 per cent of the unemployed (Assaad and Kraft, 2013).   
Unemployment affects approximately one-sixth of the youth (15-29) in the labour market in 
Egypt are unemployed (15.7 per cent) (Barsoum et al., 2014).  Young women are at a particular 
disadvantage in Egypt’s labour market, with their unemployment rate reaching more than five 
times the rate among young men (38.1 per cent compared to 6.8 per cent) (Barsoum et al., 2014).    
 
Unemployment is not the only concern about youth labour market outcomes in Egypt.  Nine 
out of ten workers from the youth aged 15-29  (91.1 per cent) are in informal employment in 
Egypt (Barsoum et al., 2014). These include workers in informal (unregistered) enterprises and 
paid employees holding informal jobs in the formal sector but do not receive other benefits such 
as social security contributions or paid annual or sick leave. Higher education in Egypt has long 
been a shelter from employment informality, thanks to a scheme of guaranteed employment for 
graduates in the civil service and state-owned enterprises that was initiated in 1962.  This sector 
of employment provides job stability and security benefits that are not matched by the private 
sector.   With the relinquishing of the guaranteed employment scheme and the implementation of 
structural adjustment policies in the early 1990s, university graduates came to face new realities 
of employment informality. Informality, as the analysis in this paper shows, is also highly 
prevalent among the sample of university graduates included in this study. Employment 
characteristics are greatly defined by the sector of employment in Egypt.  The civil service sector 
and state-owned enterprises provide employees with work stability, work contracts and different 
social security benefits.  Their salaries, however, can be lower than the formal private sector 
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(Said, 2009).  Barsoum (2015) documents the continued valorization of civil service jobs among 
youth for benefits related to job security.   
3. Research Framework 
3.1 Private Institutions and Higher Education Outcomes 
 
There is little empirical research examining the labour market outcomes of private higher 
education institutions in comparison to public institutions. The fact that the growing role of 
private institutions is a relatively recent phenomenon in the higher education landscape 
worldwide explains this dearth of empirical studies. The novelty of the phenomenon and the 
typology of institutions take the prime focus of research (e.g. Altbach et al., 2009; Mok, 2009).  
Similarly, the idea of “privateness” in higher education and the impact of globalization and the 
neoliberal tide dominate the literature (e.g. Mok, 2009).  Issues of governance and relationship to 
the state have also attracted researchers and debates (e.g. Dobbins and Leisyte, 2013; Neave, 
2012). In Egypt, most of the research on private higher education focuses on issues of equity due 
to the legacy of subsidized education (e.g. Fahim, 2010; and Al-Araby, 2010).   
 
There is, however, a rich body of literature on higher education access and outcomes that 
would be relevant to the study of private institutions. In this literature, the role of the family 
background and socio-economic status has shown to be a significant determinant of life 
opportunities and labour market outcomes. The Nobel Prize winner, Gary Becker (1988:10), 
stresses how earnings regress strongly to the mean between fathers and sons “in every country 
with data” that he has seen.  Rumberger (2010), looking at data from the United States, confirms 
the powerful impact of social class background on college completion, showing that the odds of 
completing college for a student from a higher socio-economic status are more than six times 
higher than for a student from a lower social class background. Similarly, Bowles and Gintis 
(2002: 21–22) note that parental income and wealth are strong predictors of the likely economic 
status of the next generation. The sociological literature on the impact of family background on 
education outcomes is abundant. Seminal works by Pierre Bourdieu and colleagues stress the 
impact of social and cultural class reproduction (for example Bourdieu, 1990; and Bourdieu and 
Passeron, 1977).  
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A few studies focused on determinants pertaining to the type of higher education in 
labour market outcomes.  For example, Rumberger and Thomas (1993) focus on the role of the 
type of specialization, the undergraduate performance as measured by grade point average 
(GPA), and the quality of the higher education institutions.  Smith et al. (2000) similarly focused 
on the subject of study and status of the institution as significant determinants, while still 
accounting for the importance of family background and socio-economic status on labour market 
outcomes in the UK.  Støren and Wiers-Jenssen (2010) compared outcomes of foreign and local 
diplomas in labour market outcomes in immigrant societies. Pavlin (2014) looked at the 
commitment of senior professors and managers in higher education institutions in Post-Bologna 
Europe to their role in preparing graduates for entry to the labour market. Deželan et al. (2014) 
looked education-job match of political science graduates from Slovenia and other countries in 
Europe. 
 
In terms of outcome variables, earnings and employability remain the predominant 
variables in empirical research on higher education outcomes. Rumberger and Thomas (1993) 
looked at earnings as their dependent variable. Smith et al. (2000) focused on the employability 
of graduates and their first destination as the outcome variable. This paper extends the analysis 
on labour market outcomes for higher education by also looking at job fringe benefits as an 
outcome.   The rationale for the inclusion of job benefits relates to the earlier discussion on the 
increasing employment informality in Egypt, particularly among the youth. This analysis 
resonates with Baah-Boateng (2015) for the inadequacy of the focus on unemployment as a 
measure of economic integration in contexts with high informality such as sub-Saharan Africa or 
the Middle East. By addressing job security, it is hypothesized that investment in higher 
education would safeguard graduates from precarious jobs and would offer a higher level of job 
security and benefits in comparison to the general population. Job security remains an 
understudied domain in relation to higher education outcomes. This is probably the case since it 
has been long assumed that graduates of higher education would be sheltered from bad jobs by 
virtue of their education.   Given the prevalence of informality in Egypt and limited access to job 
security and fringe benefits, we opted in this paper to focus on this central issue.  Anker et al. 
(2002; 2003) address security at work in relation to the need to help safeguard health, pensions 
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and livelihoods, and to provide adequate financial and other protection in the event of health and 
other contingencies. The focus on job benefits and security recognizes workers’ need to limit 
insecurity associated with the possible loss of work and livelihood.  Adequate social protection is 
a defining feature of decent work around the world (Anker et al., 2002:52). The ILO estimates 
that only some 20 per cent of the world’s labour force has access to adequate social protection 
(ibid.).   
3.2 Research Questions 
 
This paper is concerned with the question on whether there are differences in the labour market 
outcomes between graduates of at-fees private higher education institutions and those of free (at 
nominal fees) public institutions.  The paper addresses three specific labour market outcomes: 
the employment probability during the first six months after graduation; the level of job fringe 
benefits in the current job through a constructed job fringe benefits (including job security) as 
discussed in the following section; and the earnings of the current job.   
4. Data and Method 
 
The paper benefits from the analysis of a recently fielded household survey (2012) tracing 
university graduates aged 25-40 in two disciplines that have been the target of private education 
institutions, namely business administration and information technology.  The survey data 
collection tool collected information on graduates’ socio-economic background and parental 
characteristics, education experience, first job experience, current job experience and 
employment history and mobility.  The sample for this survey has been extracted from recent 
rounds of the Labour Force Survey (LFS), with the help of Egypt central statistical bureau, 
CAPMAS.
4
  The interviewed graduates were identified as a sub-sample of the LFS.  The sample 
of the LFS is a nationally representative sample extracted based on a two-stage stratified cluster 
sample and self-weighted to the extent practical (CAPMAS, 2012).   The survey sub-sample was 
selected based on a number of criteria.  Because university graduates are highly heterogeneous in 
terms of skills and specialization, we limited the sample and the analysis to a small number of 
                                                 
4
 Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics.  Data collection for this study was undertaken by CAPMAS in 
collaboration with the Economic Research Forum. 
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specializations, namely business administration and information sciences.  As noted earlier, these 
two specializations were selected because of the larger role of private universities play in the 
production of these skills.  The survey focused on graduates aged 25-40 in these two disciplines 
who are currently working or have ever worked.   
 
The final sample of the survey had 1713 graduates. Out of this sample, 413 graduated 
from private higher education institutions, constituting 24% of the sample.  This is a good 
representation that resonates with national statistics about private higher education in the country 
as noted earlier. The mean age of the subsample of graduates was 28.9 years, with a standard 
deviation of 4.2 years.  About 74% of the respondents in the sample were male.  This gender 
skewedness in the sample representation is due to the fact that the survey design limited the 
criteria for inclusion to graduates who ever worked.  The increasing de-feminization of the 
Egyptian labour market (Assaad, 2005) explains the low representation of female graduates in 
the sample.  
4.1 Methodology 
 
To evaluate the effect of university education type and quality on labor market outcomes, the 
below model has been used, where y measures labor market success while X is a vector that 
contains graduate’s characteristics and Uni is vector that indicates education type and quality. 
The studies focusing on the return of education are commonly subject to selection bias, as 
students with high grades are attracted to high quality and prestigious universities causing 
ambiguity in disentangling between the quality of education obtained and innate ability. 
Consequently, it is necessary to control for this bias through the incorporation of pre-university 
factors that control for the heterogeneity in innate ability among students. Additionally, students 
of economically better-off households may have the option to enroll at prestigious foreign 
universities in Egypt such as the American University or the German University in Cairo that 
implies the impact of education type and quality maybe picked up by the socio-economic status 
of the graduate. Therefore, variables that assess the graduate family-economic status before 
university enrollment have been included in the model.  Factors such father’s occupation status, 
father’s education, mother’s education, student’s achievement in secondary school and other 
factors are used for above purpose.   
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Using the graduate tracer study data, the analysis in this paper is based on two modeling 
approaches.  Linear probability model with robust standard error for the dependent binary 
variable of the first model is applied, looking at the probability of employment in the first six 
months after graduation.  In the second and third models, an ordinary least squares (OLS) model 
is applied for the two continuous dependent variables of job fringe benefits and earnings. The 
dependent variable of job fringe benefits is an index built based on access to the following 
benefits:  stable work contract that is for a minimum duration of one year; social insurance; 
health insurance; paid annual leaves; paid sick leaves; end of service compensation; and access 
to bonuses and salary raises.  The index is based on a principal components analysis with each of 
the above characteristics receiving a weight based on the analysis of principal components. In the 
analysis of the third model, wages in the current job are transformed into natural log form.  This 
reduces the influence of outliers in income and allows for the interpretation of the effect of 
covariates as a percent change in wages.  
 
The paper examines three categories of explanatory variables for all three models: 
 
1. Individual background variables:  These include gender; years since graduation; access to 
computers at home at age 15; pre-university type of schooling in terms of access to 
foreign languages (with dummy 1 for private language schools, which is more expensive 
than other schooling); and score in the secondary education graduation completion 
examination “thanawya ama”, in addition to the overall grade at the end university study 
(excellent, very good, good, average, accepted).  The models control for the type (public 
vs private) of preparatory and secondary school. The analysis also control for the father’s 
education level; mother’s education level and father’s working status (wage worker in 
public sector, wage worker in formal private sector, wage worker in informal private 
sector, employer, self employed, contributing family worker, other, not working, 
deceased, and do not know).  Binary variables whether the graduate had internships 
opportunities; volunteering experience; and summer-time employment during school. The 
analysis includes a dummy 1 for employment in civil service and publically owned 
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enterprises. Governorate’s fixed effect has been controlled for by the inclusion of 
dummies for each governorate.  
 
2. Education Institution level variables: these include factors that capture the type and 
quality of education in the education institution. A binary variable 1, for private 
institutions. Other institutional level variables include the language of instruction in 
higher education (dummy variable for access to teaching in English or a mix of English 
and Arabic); and use of active learning methods in teaching (group work, problem 
solving techniques, student presentations and research projects, with a dummy variable of 
1 for any of these teaching techniques) in addition to a binary variable based on the 
response of the following question: "Did the university provide students with the 
opportunity to evaluate faculty members on a regular basis?” In absence of institutional 
ranking in Egypt, similar to those used by Rumberger and Thomas (1993) or by Smith et 
al. (2000), the analysis is limited to these variables at the institution level. 
5. Results 
 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
In the first model, the paper examines the probability of employment during the six months 
following graduation.  A little more than half the graduates were employed in the first six-month 
following graduation, with 51.9 per cent being wage workers, 2.3 per cent being employers and 4 
per cent being self-employed.  Unemployment prevalence in the first status after graduation was 
at 29.3 per cent among all graduates, with more prevalence about graduates of public universities 
(30.5 per cent) than among graduates of private universities (26.9 per cent).  Moreover, 11.1 per 
cent of graduates were detached from the labour market, with the prevalence among graduates of 
private universities higher than among public universities (17.8 per cent compared to 7.7 per 
cent). These results are commensurate with labour statistics in Egypt with regards to university 
graduates discussed earlier. 
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Figure 1: Employment Status during the Six Months Following Graduation by Type of Higher 
Education (%) 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations, survey data 
 
The second dependent variable relates to access to better job quality measures as 
explained in the earlier section.  The table below shows that graduates of private institutions 
generally had a lower score on the job quality index.   
 
Table 1: Mean of job fringe benefits by type of Higher Education 
Education’s type Mean Std. Err. 95% Confidence Interval 
Graduates of Public Institutions 0.05 0.03 -0.01 0.11 
Graduates of Private Institutions -0.10 0.04 -0.19 -0.02 
Source: Authors’ calculations, survey data 
 
The third dependent variable is the current salary earnings.  Table 2 shows that the mean 
current salary for graduates from both public and private institutions was LE 1531.27 (about 
US$230) and the minimum monthly pay was LE 200 (about US$90).  Table 3 in the appendix 
provides a description of selected variables included in the analysis. 
Table 2: Monthly Salary in Egyptian pounds by type of education 
Education’s type Mean Std. Err. 95% Confidence Interval 
Public 1516 57.2 1404.7 1629.2 
Private 1562 69.4 1426.3 1698.7 
Source: Authors’ calculations, survey data 
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5.2 Estimation Results 
5.2.1 Employment in the First Six Months after Graduation 
 
We first explore the probability of being employed within six months of graduation. 
Table 4 in the appendix includes the results of this model. The results indicate that there is a 
significant negative impact of graduating from a private institution on the likelihood of getting a 
job in the first six months following graduation. Private higher education is associated with a 
lower likelihood of being employed in the first six months after graduation. This might reflect a 
preference in the job market for graduates of public institutions; lower social capital and 
networking potentials to find jobs; or that these graduates prefer to wait for better opportunities 
and do not accept the first job opportunity made available. The significant impact shown in the 
table of the variable of years since graduation is interesting.  While this model looks at graduates 
in their first months after graduation, older graduates seem to have been less privileged than the 
more recent graduates.   The years since graduation variable here is to interpret in this model as 
cohort effect.   One explanation for this was provided by Assaad and Kraft (2013) who argue that 
the impact of the youth bulge on the labour market has eased, comparing data from 2006 and 
2012.   
Ascribed characteristics such as low of parents’ education and low profile job are a 
significant determinant to the likelihood of finding a first job within six months of graduation. 
Another significant predictor for the probability of employment within the first six months of 
graduation as table 7 shows is summer work.  In the context of OECD countries, public programs 
promoting early labour market contacts for high school students are commonplace and have been 
repeatedly advocated by the OECD (Alam, Carling and Nääs, 2013). Häkkinen (2006) notes that 
pre-graduation employment may provide an opportunity complement the formal education and 
improve study motivation, particularly when the employment relates to the field of study.   Pre-
graduation work allows improving job search skills along with other important life skills such as 
better communication skills (ibid.).  These opportunities also familiarize students with the world 
of work and allow them to gain a sense of responsibility. These valuable skills can have a 
positive impact on employment outcomes post-graduation. Häkkinen (ibid.) also argues that 
summer employment might signal potential future employers about attributes such as motivation 
and work ethics.  Other favorable arguments for summer jobs discussed by Alam, Carling and 
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Nääs (2013) include access to skills and knowledge not accessible through in-class education; 
the potentials to enhance motivation to study; and the earnings that can alleviate poverty.  
Summer work can also smooth the transition from school to work by collecting information and 
establishing a social network that helps in finding their first regular job (ibid.). 
5.2.2 Level of Access to Job Fringe Benefits in the Current Job 
 
The second dependent variable relates to access to job fringe benefits measures in the current 
job.  In this model, we apply multivariate OLS.  Unlike the earlier model on the probability of 
finding a job in the first months after graduation, the results of this model indicate that the type 
of institution does not have a statistically significant impact on the level of job benefits in the 
current job, with a value coefficient that is very close to zero. The quality of received education 
measured by teaching approaches also does not hold a significant impact on this labour market 
outcome. The results in table 4 show that, similar to the earlier model, ascribed characteristics 
are significant determinants to labour market outcomes in Egypt. Father’s education is also 
another key determinant to the level of job benefits in the current job.  Private schooling in the 
primary stage is another proxy for family higher socio-economic status, since these schools are 
more expensive than other schools. The impact of these ascribed and pre-education variables 
dwarfs the effect of the type of higher education institution in the labour market outcome 
pertaining to job benefits.    
 
Score in the secondary education completion examination had a positive significant 
impact on the level of job benefits. Higher scores could indicate higher innate abilities pertaining 
to hard work or intellectual and mental capabilities. The score provides a proxy for innate 
abilities and allows the model to avoid bias in coefficient.  While the impact of the score is not 
significant in the first model, perhaps because students with higher scores prefer to wait for 
better jobs, it pays off in terms of job quality as table 4 shows. The score can also be a proxy for 
the family background and socio-economic status.  Because it is common for families to 
complement secondary school education with private tutoring, higher scores can be a proxy of 
the family’s spending on this usually costly support to students in order to perform better in the 
final examination (El-Badawy, 2009). While most families provide their children with private 
tutoring, the variation in cost is very high, reflecting a variation in quality and possible outcome 
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in terms of final scores (ibid.).  As would be expected, years since graduation improve the level 
of job benefits. This concurs with international literature on the decent work deficit among new 
entrants to the labour market from the youth (ILO, 2014).  
5.2.3 Earnings of Current Job 
In the analysis of the third model, we transform wages in the current job into natural log form.   
As noted earlier, the log form reduces the influence of outliers in income and allows for the 
interpretation of the effect of covariates as a percent change in wages.  The results show that 
private higher education has no significant effect on job earnings. The analysis supports the 
arguments made earlier about the role of ascribed characteristics.  First, gender is a major 
predictor of income.  Being male is associated with an increase of income by more than 50%.   
Another significant predictor is the father’s education, which is associated with higher income in 
the current job.  As the table shows, the value of the father education coefficient is quite high 
relative to the rest of the variables, associated with a stark increase in wages.  Father who works 
as employer and owns business is associated higher earning for his son and daughters. Also 
directly related to the family background is the access to primary computer.  Attending private 
school has a significant positive impact on earnings.  Private schooling is more expensive than 
public schooling, which is offered at nominal fees.  Private schooling is a marker of family 
wealth.  Better-off families opt to give their children more expensive private schooling, 
particularly in the early stages.    
6. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
The analysis in this paper shows that the type of the institution does not have a significant impact 
on labour market outcomes for graduates in ICT and business in Egypt. Ascribed characteristics, 
particularly parental socio-economic status were the significant determinants to the likelihood of 
finding a first job within six months of graduation; level of job fringe benefits in current job and 
income in current job. The male advantage has also been significant in the earning outcome. 
Father’s education has been a significant determinant in all three models.  Score in the secondary 
education completion examination had some positive significant impact on the level of job 
benefits and income. While higher scores could indicate higher innate abilities pertaining to hard 
work or intellectual and mental capabilities, they can also be a proxy for the family socio-
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economic status due to the prevalent use of private tutoring.  We, therefore, relate the impact of 
the score in secondary education completion examination to the parental socio-economic 
background and ascribed characteristics. Surprising, achieving high grades at the high education 
institution did not a return at the labor market outcome. This has bleak interpretation as family 
connection and nepotism may have higher weight on getting a decent job.      
 
Graduates of public institutions were more likely to join the civil service and publicly 
owned enterprises.  This relates to recent regulation of hiring in this sector, where top performing 
students from public higher education institutions are invited to apply to civil service jobs (El-
Baradei, 2013).  These policies have been reflected in our analysis of their labour market 
outcomes in terms of job benefits and earnings. The argument in relation to the impact of 
summer work corresponds with the mixed results in the international literature on this issue 
(Häkkinen, 2006; Hotz et al., 2002; Alam et al., 2013).   Summer work is positively associated 
with the likelihood of finding a job in the first six months after graduation.  However, its impact 
diminishes in looking at the level of job benefits or income in the current job.  A number of 
issues in relation to the difference between private and public higher education institutions seem 
to be dwarfing the impact of the type of the institution on labour market outcomes.  The first is 
that private institutions are at fees, whereas public institutions are predominately for nominal 
fees.   With the significant impact of the family socio-economic background that we discuss in 
this paper, the fees paid signify a higher socio-economic background and would be associated 
with a positive impact on the labour market outcomes of graduates from private institutions.  
However, the fact that not all public institutions are for nominal fees confounds this argument.  
Elite at-fees programs that provide education in foreign languages in public institutions confound 
these results.  This has been the case for business administration, with English section opened at 
higher fees.  The presence of these programs confounds the difference between public and 
private institutions labour market outcomes.   Moreover, with the exception of elite universities, 
private institutions accept lower grades in the secondary education completion examination.  
Graduates of public institutions, therefore, could have higher innate abilities pertaining to hard 
work or intellectual and mental capabilities.  This would have an unobservable impact on labour 
market outcomes.  Moreover, because public institutions accept students with a higher score, this 
too can be a proxy to a higher socio-economic background as noted earlier. 
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To summarize, institutional-level variables in terms of teaching approaches and language 
of instruction had no significant impact on the labour market outcomes.  This corresponds with 
the argument by Assaad et al. (2014), looking at data from Egypt and Jordan, that the labour 
markets in these two countries are less responsive to the education institution variables and is 
primarily affected by ascribed characteristics of family background and gender.   As the analysis 
in this paper shows, pre-education and post-education variables mattered most in determining the 
labour market outcomes, regardless of the type of higher education obtained. 
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Table 3: Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max Variable Description 
 Dependent Variable      
Emply 1710 0.58 0.49 0 1 First employment during the six months following graduation 
Security_index 1505 0 1 -1.0 1.5 Job index is a proxy of job quality 
logwage 1371 7 0.77 5.2 10.4 Log salary in current position 
 
Individual background 
     
Gender 1710 0.74 0.43 0 1 Male=1 , female=0 
Yrsgrd 1710 6.50 4.2 0 20 years since graduation 
Computer use 1710 0.33 0.47 0 1 Access to computer at home at age 15 
Private_school 1710 0.23 0.42 0 1 pre-university type of schooling in terms of public or private, private =1, other=0 
Score 1654 75.7 9.6 50 97 Grade percentage in the secondary education graduation completion examination 
“thanawya ama 
univ_priv 1710 0.33 0.47 0 1 0-1 dummy variable, =1 if student is a graduate of private institute (University or 
institute) 
language 1710 0.15 0.36 0 1 language of instruction in higher education, English or English and Arabic=1, only 
Arabic=0   
Active 1710 0.33 0.47 0 1 use of active learning methods in teaching in higher education. Dummy variable=1 
if teaching always involves groups projects, research projects, students’ 
presentations, teaching based on problem solving and case studies  
internship 1710 0.11 0.32 0 1 Had an internship during university study=1 and otherwise=0 
summerwork 1710 0.46 0.49 0 1 Had a job during university study or summer vacation during the bachelor=1 and 
otherwise=0 
volunteer 1710 0.05 0.22 0 1 Volunteer work during university study=1 and otherwise=0 
       
Source: Authors’ calculations, survey data
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Table 4: Regression Results 
Variable Log Wage Job Prospect Job benefits 
Male 0.508*** 0.0510  0.0608  
 
(9.78) (1.64)  (1.86)  
Years since graduation -0.0107 -0.00977**  0.0352*** 
 
(-1.84) (-3.15)  (10.86)  
Access to Computer at home 
   
Yes 0.114* 0.00299  -0.0268  
 
(2.10) (0.09)  (-0.75)  
Access to internet at home 
   
Yes -0.00877 -0.000217  -0.00579  
 
(-0.13) (-0.01)  (-0.13)  
Access to books and magazines at home 
   
Yes 0.00081 -0.000660  -0.0470  
 
(0.02) (-0.02)  (-1.54)  
Private Secondary school 
   
Yes -0.11 -0.0517  0.0465  
 
(-1.00) (-0.79)  (0.70)  
Grade at high school (thanawya ama) 0.0042 0.000421  0.00337*  
 
(1.64) (0.29)  (2.28)  
Private University 
   
Yes -0.0239 -0.139**  0.0192  
 
(-0.32) (-3.12)  (0.43)  
Grade at University (pass is base group) 
   
excellent -0.365 0.215  0.0622  
 
(-0.90) (1.58)  (0.34)  
very good -0.0115 0.0862  0.0183  
 
(-0.09) (1.41)  (0.31)  
good 0.00273 -0.0179  0.0926**  
 
(0.05) (-0.56)  (2.79)  
average 0.327 0.114  0.260*  
 
(1.72) (0.81)  (2.22)  
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Interaction term private university graduate and university 
grade    
Private. Excellent -1.297 -0.0411  -0.0958  
 
(-1.46) (-0.13)  (-0.32)  
Private.very good 0.00376 0.134  -0.0558  
 
(0.02) (1.43)  (-0.56)  
Private.good -0.0195 0.135*  -0.126*  
 
(-0.20) (2.35)  (-2.20)  
Private.average -0.217 -0.0832  -0.0719  
 
(-0.99) (-0.44)  (-0.41)  
Language of instruction at university 
   
English or English and Arabic 0.0894 0.00251  0.00649  
 
(1.51) (0.07)  (0.17)  
Active learning methods at university 
   
Yes 0.0303 -0.00222  -0.0268  
 
(0.60) (-0.08)  (-0.91)  
Had internship during university 
   
Yes -0.0603 -0.0267  0.0378  
 
(-0.85) (-0.68)  (0.94)  
Job during summer 
   
Yes 0.00439 0.155*** -0.0208  
 
(0.09) (5.61)  (-0.72)  
Volunteer work during university 
   
Yes 0.069 0.0779  0.0467  
 
(0.63) (1.33)  (0.72)  
University allow faculty evaluation 
   
No -0.059 -0.0842  -0.0240  
 
(-0.50) (-1.20)  (-0.35)  
Father's education (Illiterate=base group) 
   
Preparatory or lower 0.0566 -0.113**  -0.0130  
 
(0.70) (-2.58)  (-0.29)  
Secondary or diploma 0.248** -0.0440  0.0388  
 (3.12) (-0.98)  (0.85)  
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above secondary 0.331*** -0.0578  0.116*  
 (3.58) (-1.07)  (2.16)  
Postgraduate 0.308 -0.0498  0.173  
 
(1.33) (-0.42)  (1.25)  
Mother's education level 
   
Illiterate -0.0577 -0.0343  0.0508  
 
(-0.89) (-0.91)  (1.35)  
Preparatory or lower -0.0405 -0.0401  0.00398  
 
(-0.64) (-1.01)  (0.10)  
Secondary or diploma -0.166 -0.0218  0.0209  
 
(-1.85) (-0.42)  (0.39)  
above secondary 0.385 -0.00898  0.143  
 
(0.89) (-0.03)  (0.59)  
Attended primary private school 
   
Yes -0.0186 -0.0293  0.0490  
 
(-0.26) (-0.65)  (1.10)  
Attended preparatory private school 
   
Yes 0.228* 0.0582  -0.0115  
 
(2.57) (1.10)  (-0.21)  
Father's occupation ( Wage worker in public sector =omitted) 
   
Wage worker in formal private sector 0.095 -0.0437  -0.0370  
 
(1.43) (-0.96)  (-0.77)  
Wage worker in informal private sec. 0.0031 -0.0347  -0.155**  
 
(0.03) (-0.67)  (-3.15)  
Employer  0.197** -0.0518  -0.0675  
 
(3.07) (-1.30)  (-1.66)  
Self-employed -0.0227 -0.134**  -0.103*  
 
(-0.31) (-3.30)  (-2.50)  
Other -0.0147 -0.190  0.0139  
 
(-0.04) (-1.01)  (0.10)  
Not working -0.3 -0.0672  0.0269  
 
(-1.42) (-0.47)  (0.20)  
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Deceased -0.0295 -0.0512  0.0361  
 
(-0.28) (-0.74)  (0.52)  
Unknown 0.662 0.0504  0.0368  
 
(1.24) (0.18)  (0.14)  
_cons 5.535*** 0.713*** -0.107  
 
(21.93) (4.81)  (-0.71)  
Governorate Fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
N 1304 1637  1442  
R2 0.22 0.1 0.172 
t-statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
